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 Haller 1 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The world will never forget that the Nazi regime ruthlessly targeted and murdered over 
twenty-five million innocent humans. Children torn from parents. Families destroyed. Starvation, 
disease, and death plagued the lives of Jews and other minorities for years under Hitler’s 
totalitarian rule. Following liberation, shock and disgust radiated throughout the world when the 
horrors of the death camps were revealed. Why, then, in the seventy-five years since the 
founding of the UN, have dozens of genocides occurred worldwide resulting in the systematic 
murders of millions of innocent people? After the Holocaust, the world wondered how a 
government could kill so many of its own citizens in such an organized fashion simply because 
of who they are. In response, the world proclaimed that such an atrocity would happen “never 
again.” The destruction that World War II caused led to the founding of the UN. It was intended, 
in part, to act as a means to prevent these violent and senseless deaths in the future. Since the 
founding of the UN in 1945, genocide has resulted in the murders of millions of innocent men, 
women, and children. Genocide occurred unabated in China, the Soviet Union, Cambodia, 
Bosnia, North Korea, Iraq, Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda, Darfur, and many other nations. Genocide 
still occurs today in places such as Myanmar, China, and Syria. Once again, however, the world 
continues to stand by as governments terrorize and brutalize millions of their own citizens. 
Despite the world proclaiming never again, genocide continues to happen ever again. Why is it 
that since its founding the UN has failed countless times, and continues to fail, in preventing 
genocide and mass murder? This thesis will address this question by a close look at the structural 
dynamics of the UN that impede its ability to prevent genocide. The record of the UN on 
genocide prevention is a clear failure. This points to the need for significant reform to address 
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the problems with the specific structural components that are essential to the UN addressing 
genocide.  
 Unfortunately, there are ample examples of genocide despite the presence of the UN. The 
communist governments of the Soviet Union and China both imprisoned and killed tens of 
millions of their own citizens in the early decades of the UN’s existence. Furthermore, the 
Cambodian Genocide occurred in the wake of the Vietnam War. The communist Khmer Rouge, 
led by Pol Pot, took control of the Cambodian government in 1975. His “four-year reign left 
some 2 million Cambodians dead.”1 This constituted roughly a quarter of the population of 
Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge freely conducted their reign of terror with no pressure or 
condemnation from the UN or Western nations. The ruthless murders of millions of innocent 
Cambodians were overshadowed by the mess of the Vietnam War. The United Nations did not 
intervene in any meaningful way stop the senseless murders.  
 Just a decade later in Iraq, Saddam Hussein perpetrated genocide against the Kurds. 
Hussein conducted a gassing campaign to eliminate the Kurdish minority from Iraq. He 
attributed the thousands of Kurdish deaths to the ongoing war with Iran. This war that occurred 
simultaneously clouded the blatant genocide. There was an “absence of any international outcry 
over this act of mass murder, despite Kurdish efforts to press the matter with the United Nations 
and Western governments.”2 This lack of international attention ultimately “emboldened 
Baghdad to believe that it could get away with an even larger operation without any adverse 
reaction.”3 Once again, the UN did little to stop the violence, ultimately encouraging the killers.  
 
1 Power, Samantha. A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide. Basic Books, 2013, 
XIX.  
2 “Introduction: Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds.” Human Rights 
Watch, 1993. 
3 “Genocide in Iraq.” 
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 The genocide in Darfur is another example of large-scale violence that the international 
community was unable to resolve. Darfur, a region of Sudan, is prone to instability because it is a 
“multi-ethnic country with a dictatorial government dominated by an Arab and Islamist elite.”4 
Government forces “systematically depopulated land…through forced displacement and violent 
attacks on civilians that amount to ethnic cleansing and genocide.”5 From 2003 to 2005, “an 
estimated 200,000 civilians died from violence, disease and starvation as a result of the conflict, 
and 2 million were displaced from their homes.”6 The United States urged “a strong response by 
the UN Security Council…but no agreement was reached on this.”7 Despite the systematic nature 
of the violence in Darfur, the UN Security Council did not produce any resolutions condemning 
the genocide. Overall, the failure to intervene in several genocides over the years have been 
serious points of embarrassment for the UN. Two of the most prominent examples are Rwanda 
and Bosnia. I will discuss these in more detail in subsequent chapters along with the current 
failure to prevent the ongoing genocide in Myanmar.  
 Even in the immediate wake of the Holocaust, the UN still resisted adopting a law 
condemning genocide. The word “genocide” did not even exist prior to World War II. Raphael 
Lemkin, a Holocaust Refugee from Poland, literally dedicated his life to ensuring that the crime 
perpetrated by the Nazis be given a name. Lemkin refused to give up on his efforts of ensuring 
that genocide prevention become an international priority. In her book, A Problem from Hell, 
former U.S. ambassador to the UN Samantha Power details how Lemkin’s heroic efforts to 
prevent genocide shaped the world to follow. Lemkin worked tirelessly for years to make certain 
 
4 “Darfur.” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum. 
5 “Darfur.” 
6 “Darfur.”   
7 Morgan, Patrick. International Security: Problems and Solutions. CQ Press, U.S., 2006, 279. 
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that the atrocities he witnessed and escaped in Nazi Germany would never happen again. Lemkin 
fled Germany because he noticed the writing on the wall prior to the genocide, such as the 
rhetorical dehumanization of Jews and the passage of oppressive policies targeting Jews. Powers 
states that Lemkin “had been determined to find a new word to replace ‘barbarity’ and 
‘vandalism’... Lemkin had hunted for a term that would describe assaults on all aspects of 
nationhood- physical biological, political, social, cultural, economic, and religious.”8 Lemkin 
invented the word genocide to describe the events of the Holocaust because it “was short, it was 
novel, and it was not likely to be mispronounced. Because of the word’s association with Hitler’s 
horrors, it would also send shudders down the spines of those who heard it.”9 The association of 
genocide with the Holocaust conveys a serious responsibility to the international community to 
stop the violence in order to follow through with the proclamation of never again. Lemkin 
defined genocide as “‘a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of 
essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups 
themselves.”10 He spent most of his life lobbying Congress and the United Nations to use the 
word “genocide” and accept his particular definition of it. Creating a global law against genocide 
was so important to Lemkin that “journalists frequently spotted him in the UN cafeteria 
cornering delegates, but they never saw him eat. In his rush to persuade delegates to support him, 
he frequently fainted from hunger.”11 As a result of his crusade to make genocide prevention an 
international priority, he was “completely alone in the world and perennially sleepless, he often 
wandered the streets at night.”12 Lemkin was so passionate in his efforts because he knew that 
 
8 Power, 40. 
9 Power, 42. 
10 Power, 43. 
11 Power, 52.  
12 Power, 52. 
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“the destruction of foreign national or ethnic identities would bring huge losses to the world’s 
cultural heritage.”13 Genocide is not simply a mass killing of individuals; it is a systematic plan 
with the intent of eradicating an entire group of humans simply because of who they are, not 
what they did. 
 The genocide that the Nazis perpetrated was certainly one of the defining characteristics 
of World War II. The UN is one mechanism that, in theory, possesses the means to prevent 
another occurrence of genocide or mass murder like the Holocaust. The goals of the United 
Nations are laid out in the Charter of the United Nations. Article I of the United Nations Charter 
states that the purposes of the UN are:  
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to 
take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal 
of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of 
aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by 
peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice 
and international law, adjustment or settlement of international 
disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the 
peace…To achieve international co-operation in solving 
international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or 
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect 
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and to be a center 
for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these 
common ends.14  
 
Furthermore, the preamble to the charter states the UN seeks “to save succeeding generations 
from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and 
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in 
the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.”15 Both the Preamble and 
 
13 Power, 53.  
14 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, article 1.1. 
15 UN Charter, preamble.  
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Article 1 assert the importance of the dignity of each individual as a human being and emphasize 
the need to respect and maintain human rights throughout the globe. This is a goal that cannot be 
achieved in a world where genocide can occur unabated. Despite aiming at such lofty but noble 
goals, structural and political components of the UN system actively impede their realization.  
 
The UN and Genocide 
 In an effort to address the not so distant horrors of the Holocaust, in 1948 the newly 
founded United Nations passed the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide. It was largely a result of Lemkin’s relentless lobbying. The Convention defined 
genocide as:  
Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as 
such: 
Killing members of the group; 
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
Deliberately inflicting on the group the conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in 
part; 
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.16  
 
In his book Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention, Scott Straus states that the 
1948 Genocide Convention,  
explicitly and implicitly recognized that international actors had a 
duty to groups of any country that were at risk of genocide. The 
Genocide Convention went further than either the UN Charter or 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights because it obligated 
signatories to prevent and punish the crime. That formulation 
represented a significant challenge to the traditional notion of state 
 
16 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article II.  
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sovereignty, which held that states had the ultimate authority to 
treat citizens as they saw fit.17  
 
The Genocide Convention was necessary to elevate the issue of genocide to one of global 
importance. It declared that all nations have a responsibility protect their citizens from the 
horrors of genocide. In addition, Article VIII of Convention expresses that states have a duty to 
protect citizens in other states from genocide. It states that signatories are obligated to “call upon 
the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action… appropriate for the prevention 
and suppression of acts of genocide.”18  States, therefore, have a moral obligation to intervene to 
prevent genocide. They cannot use the principle of state sovereignty as reasoning for ignoring 
the atrocity. On this note, in his 2013 address to the UN General Assembly, President Obama 
stated, “Different nations will not agree on the need for action in every instance, and the 
principle of sovereignty is at the center of our international order. But sovereignty cannot be a 
shield for tyrants to commit wanton murder, or an excuse for the international community to 
turn a blind eye.”19 There is a fine line that must be drawn between respecting state sovereignty 
and intervening to save civilian lives.  
Since the adoption of the Genocide Convention, groups around the world still perpetrated 
numerous genocides without UN intervention. One of the most prominent cases that illustrates 
this failure occurred in Rwanda in 1994. The UN withdrew its troops at a vital time when the 
Tutsi needed strong military protection from the perpetrators of the genocide, the Hutu. This 
 
17 Straus, Scott. Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention. United 
States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2016, United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum, 3. 
18 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article III. 
19 Obama , Barrack. “Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United Nations General 
Assembly.” National Archives and Records Administration, National Archives and Records 
Administration, 2013. 
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decision emboldened the killers and severely handicapped the few remaining UN troops. The 
UN’s mistakes in Rwanda allowed the genocide to occur faster and become more deadly. Powers 
states that in Rwanda “the case for a label of genocide was the most straightforward since the 
Holocaust.”20 If the UN cannot take action to intervene in a nation in which the killings are so 
similar to the Holocaust, the atrocity that the world vowed would never happen again, then in 
what case will the UN intervene? 
 Despite the many flaws in the UN, including the recurring failure to prevent genocide, the 
importance of the UN as an international organization should not be totally discounted. In his 
book, Genocide: A Reference Handbook, Howard Ball explains that the initial goal of the 1948 
Genocide Convention was to “devise strategies to stop, or intervene quickly, and provide justice 
for the victims and the perpetrators who planned and ordered the genocide.”21 The Convention 
provided nations a way to “aggressively act to make sure genocide never emerges from any 
nation-state or territory.”22 On the other hand, Ball argues that “UN specialized agencies… have 
been ‘extraordinarily effective’ in responding to the effects of mass murder and genocide.”23 For 
example, there are UN mandated tribunals to prosecute the perpetrators of genocides in both 
Rwanda and Bosnia. The UN has not completely failed to recognize genocide as it happens, but 
it is slow and often unable to act quickly and decisively to protect victims as the violence occurs. 
Therefore, it is only relatively effective after the fact. The UN helps nations heal following the 
horrors of genocide, however, by enacting peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts. Following 
the Rwandan Genocide, for example, the UN launched a humanitarian appeal and raised $762 
 
20 Power, 362. 
21 Ball, Howard. Genocide: A Reference Handbook, 2010, 31. 
22 Ball, 31. 
23 Ball, 47. 
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million in order “to respond to the enormous humanitarian challenge.”24 They used these funds 
“to ensure security and stability, support humanitarian aid, clear landmines, and help refugees 
resettle.”25   
Ten years after the failure in Rwanda, the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 
presented a five-point action plan for the prevention of genocide to the Commission on Human 
Rights in Geneva.26 The plan outlines ways in which the UN can actually be effective in curbing 
violence before it quickly escalates into genocide. In his 2004 address, Annan states that the UN 
“must attack the roots of violence and genocide: hatred, intolerance, racism, tyranny, and the 
dehumanizing public discourse that denies whole groups of people their dignity and their 
rights.”27 While Annan asserts that addressing the underlying causes of genocide is vital, he is 
also aware that there is often a dire need for armed physical intervention to stop the violence. 
Anna further states that “United Nations peacekeepers, today, are no longer restricted to using 
force only in self-defense. They are also empowered to do so in defense of their mandate, and 
that mandate often explicitly includes the protection of local civilians threatened with imminent 
violence.”28 The astronomically high death toll in Rwanda of over 800,000 in three months was 
largely due to the peacekeepers not having the authorization to use force without being fired 
upon.  
 Because the UN is an international body, there are countless political impediments 
stemming from member states that can thwart collective action in the face of crisis. In addition to 
 
24 “UNAMIR.” United Nations, United Nations, 1999. 
25 “UNAMIR.” 
26 Annan, Kofi. “Address by Kofi Annan to the Commission on Human Rights Secretary-
General.” United Nations, United Nations, 7 Apr. 2004.  
27 Annan, 2004.  
28 Annan, 2004. 
 Haller 10 
these political hurdles, there are the ever-present structural impediments that prevent action. The 
2005 World Summit brought 170 world leaders together at the UN Headquarters in New York to 
discuss and take action in several areas that impact human life throughout the world. Genocide 
was an issue at the forefront of the summit. The 2005 World Summit Outcome states, “We 
believe that today, more than ever before, we live in a global and interdependent world. No state 
can stand wholly alone. We acknowledge that collective security depends on effective 
cooperation, in accordance with international law, against transnational threats.”29 While this 
statement reaffirms the mission of the UN, this same resolution promotes action from the UN 
and its member nations by asserting a responsibility to protect and maintain the ideological 
foundations of the UN throughout the world. A separate section of the Outcome states, “We 
pledge to enhance the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, accountability and credibility of the 
United Nations system. This is our shared responsibility and interest.”30 It is in a nation’s self-
interest to ensure that the UN is an effective and strong body. This is particularly true concerning 
genocide because peace and stability cannot exist in the presence of genocide. The resolution 
goes further, however, to explicitly state that each state has a responsibility to protect against 
genocide. Article IV of the resolution, Human Rights and the Rule of Law, has a subheading 
titled “Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity.”31 This section states,  
each individual state has the responsibility to protect its 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention 
of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and 
necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in 
 
29 General Assembly Resolution 60/01, 2005 World Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/01, 24 October 
2005. 
30 Resolution 60/01. 
31 Resolution 60/01. 
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accordance with it. The international community should, as 
appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this 
responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an 
early warning capability.32 
 
The 170 nations involved in this summit accepted the responsibility to protect against genocide 
in their own nations. In doing so, they also agreed to the same responsibility take action to stop 
genocide in other nations through the resources of the UN and the international community. The 
Summit further concluded that,  
the international community…has the responsibility to use 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful 
means…to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we 
are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive 
manner, through the Security Council… should peaceful means be 
inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect 
their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. We also intend to commit ourselves, as 
necessary and appropriate, to helping states build capacity to 
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which 
are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.”33 
 
This provision asserts that the UN and the international community recognize the severity of 
genocide and the importance that comes with stopping it. The international community went as 
far as to recognize prevention as an official responsibility. Despite this effort to increase 
awareness of genocide and strengthen preventative measures in 2005, several genocides still 
occurred. This includes several that are ongoing in Myanmar and China, the latter of which the 
UN has yet to declare a genocide, It is vital, therefore, to examine what aspects of the UN led to 
this failure to save so many innocent people from death at the hands of their own governments.   
 
32 Resolution 60/01. 
33 Resolution 60/01. 
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 The UN views genocide as something that must be prevented, and that it is something 
that it can prevent. An in depth look at the many failures of UN action and intervention, 
however, prove that this is not the case. It is therefore essential to examine what aspects of the 
UN itself prevent the organization from saving the lives of countless innocent men, women, and 
children. To discover where the largest problems of the UN stem from, one must look at the 
structural mechanisms of the UN. In the following chapters I will discuss the six parts of the UN 
that are the most relevant in dealing with genocide. This includes an in depth look at the General 
Assembly, the Security Council, the Genocide Convention, the Human Rights Council, the 
Responsibility to Protect, and the inherent issues that accompany the universal membership of 
the UN. I will then examine three cases of genocide, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Myanmar, to illustrate 
how these structural impediments of the UN resulted in unnecessary and massive loss of life.  
My study will ultimately conclude that the UN must moderate its expectations of what it can 
realistically accomplish in the face of genocide. Due to the many fundamental structural issues, 
the UN is incapable of preventing and putting an end to genocide. In order to help find a 
solution, the UN must recognize that it is better equipped to address the aftermath of genocide 
rather than actual conflict. “Never again” cannot be the standard for the UN. The UN is 
inevitably doomed to fail in realizing this goal due to the structural and political impediments of 
the UN.  
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Chapter 2: UN Structure  
 There are many different departments and divisions that compose the United Nations. Six 
of those, however, are directly related to how the UN deals with genocide. The General 
Assembly, Security Council, Genocide Convention, Human Rights Council, UN membership, 
and the Responsibility to Protect all contribute to the structural issues of the UN that inhibit its 
ability to carry through with the promise of “never again.”  
 
General Assembly 
 In order to understand how the UN makes decisions relating to genocide, it is essential to 
examine the largest organ of the UN: The General Assembly. The General Assembly is the only 
division of the UN where every member nation is represented and has a vote. It is the main 
representative body that focuses on policymaking. There are currently 193 member states, and 
each state has one vote in the General Assembly. The General Assembly requires a two-thirds 
majority vote for substantial decisions regarding the admission of new members, the UN budget, 
and international peace and security.34 All other matters require a simple majority or a consensus 
without a vote.35 
The General Assembly aims to arrive at a consensus, as opposed to a traditional vote, as 
often as possible. To achieve a consensus, the General Assembly must adopt the draft of a 
resolution without taking a vote. The General Assembly does this with about 80 percent of 
resolutions.36 Consensus votes are so popular in the General Assembly because coming to a 
 
34 “General Assembly.” United Nations, United Nations. 
35 “General Assembly.” 
36 “How Decisions are Made at the UN.” United Nations, United Nations.  
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consensus inherently strengthens support for the decision.37 In order to do so, after meeting with 
delegations, the President of the General Assembly proposes “that the resolution be adopted 
without a vote.”38 This process is central to the strength of the UN and General Assembly 
resolutions. It is significant because despite the General Assembly being the largest and most 
representative organ of the UN, the “resolutions adopted by the GA on agenda items are 
considered to be recommendations and are not legally binding on the Member States.”39 The 
focus on achieving consensus, therefore, is crucial to the implementation of the resolutions. 
Consensus is by nature an inclusive process that takes into account the views and concerns of all 
193 member states. Simple majority votes, on the other hand, are divisive because there are 
inevitably winners and losers. Since General Assembly resolutions are not legally binding, those 
member states that voted no may be spiteful and less likely to respect the resolution.  
While the adoption of a resolution by consensus signals unity and agreement among the 
193 members of the UN, there are also significant consequences to this method. Reaching a 
consensus takes time and cooperation because all member states must work together to draft the 
language of the resolution. While this cooperation is beneficial, it inevitably reduces the strength 
and effectiveness of the resolution. In order to have 193 different nations that all hold different 
values to agree on the same issue, the language of the resolution must include aspects to satisfy 
each member. While it is unlikely that any member states will oppose the resolution, the result is 
ultimately a severely diluted version of the original idea. Furthermore, consensus does not equate 
to unanimity, and not “all member states agree on every word of even every paragraph of the 
 
37 “Functions and Powers of the General Assembly.” United Nations, United Nations. 
38 “Functions and Powers of the General Assembly.”  
39 “How Decisions are Made at the UN.” 
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resolution.”40 However, reaching a consensus implies that no state disagreed strongly enough to 
put the motion to a vote.41 Effective legislation cannot be drafted through this method. Although 
consensus votes project unity among nations, they ultimately produce meaningless legislation. 
For example, the General Assembly has never been able to produce a definition of terrorism 
because it is such a divisive issue that member states will constantly debate. 
Understanding that General Assembly resolutions are not legally binding is essential to 
grasping how the UN addresses genocide. The Genocide Convention is simply a General 
Assembly resolution that 151 Member States have ratified.42 While the Genocide Convention 
legally defines what constitutes genocide, it does not force member states to act. It asserts an 
obligation on those states to act, but not a legal requirement. The Genocide Convention also 
reflects that consensus votes dilute legislation. While the UN has an official definition for 
genocide, there are still large areas of ambiguity in the legislation that help facilitate inaction. 
For example, it is hard to define what constitutes intent in genocide because the definition is not 
narrowly tailored. I will discuss this further in a later section. Despite the positive appearance of 
consensus votes, they too often result in ineffective and confusing legislation. 
 This also speaks to the structure of the UN as simply a formation of strong alliances 
between many nations, as opposed to an actual government. One of the many failures of the 
Human Rights Council, for example, stems from the alliance-like structure of the UN. The 
Human Rights Council has a certain regional quota for seats on the Council. This poses a 
significant issue because “countries that depend on regional support for their selection will tend 
 
40 “How Decisions are Made at the UN.” 
41 “How Decisions are Made at the UN.” 
42 “United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect.” United 
Nations, United Nations. 
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to abide by the views of their regionally caucus.”43 Member states, especially ones with little 
power, are likely to make decisions based on what is in the best interest for their state alone. This 
could include, for example, an Asian nation not standing up to human rights violations in China 
because “it depends on the regional group for candidacies, political support, and a share of U.N. 
economic aid.”44 As a result of the alliance structure of the UN, therefore, member states may 
make decisions based on what benefits them and their allies as opposed to what is right and in 
line with the UN Charter.  
 The General Assembly meets annually from September to December. The Security 
Council, however, has the authority to call a special session of the General Assembly if 
necessary. The General Assembly is a place where representatives from any member states have 
the ability to discuss “their views on the most pressing international issues.”45 The Assembly 
then breaks into six committees to address other issues. The committees, in order, are 
“Disarmament and International Security; Economic and Financial; Social, Humanitarian and 
Cultural; Special Political and Decolonization; Administrative and Budgetary; Legal.”46 These 
committees can then suggest resolutions and decisions to the entire Assembly to vote on in 
December. 
 The President of the General Assembly holds a position that maintains order in the 
Assembly as opposed to a position of power. The President “is the guardian of the GA Rules of 
Procedure but has no say in the actual decision-making of the GA—in fact, the PGA does not 
 
43 Schaefer, Brett. “ConUNdrum: The Limits of the United Nations and the Search for 
Alternatives.” 2009, 155. 
44 Schaefer, 155. 
45 “General Assembly.”  
46 “General Assembly.”  
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have a vote in the GA.”47 Despite the lack of tangible decision making power, the role of 
President is still essential in that the President “depends on the moral authority of and the 
convening power of the office as main instruments to keep the 193 Member States working 
together.”48 Any member nation is eligible to nominate a candidate for the one-year, non-
renewable term as President.49 A nation is excluded in putting forth a nominee for President if 
the representative of the member state holds a Vice-President position or is a chair of a Main 
Committee.50 Consequently, no representative from any of the Permanent Five can serve as the 
President of the General Assembly because all of the Permanent Five always serve as Vice-
Presidents. The members of the Permanent Five are the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, Russia, and China. The General Assembly elects 21 Vice-Presidents including those 
from the Permanent Five. The Vice-President positions are divided up proportionally by region.  
 While the General Assembly appears to be the main organ of the UN, the Security 
Council has much more power. The Security Council focuses particularly on issues of 
international peace and security, such as genocide and mass murder. Overall, the work that the 
General Assembly accomplishes is essential to ensure peaceful relations among nations 
regarding a variety of issues relevant to the international community as a whole, such as climate 
change, global health, and education.  
 
The Security Council  
 The Security Council is the most significant aspect of the UN, particularly regarding 
genocide, because the primary responsibility of the Security Council is the protection of 
 
47 “General Assembly.”  
48 “General Assembly.”  
49 “General Assembly.”  
50 “General Assembly.”  
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international peace and security. The UN Charter gives the Security Council the tools to take 
authoritative action to maintain international peace. Article 39 of the UN Charter states, “The 
Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken… to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.”51 Disputes among nations are brought 
before the Security Council in order to be resolved in a peaceful manner. Therefore, “the Council 
may convene at any time, whenever peace is threatened.”52 
 The Security Council is comprised of fifteen total members, including the Permanent 
Five.53 The other ten nations are elected by the UN General Assembly for two year terms and 
attempt to reflect a “regional balance: Africa has three seats while Western Europe and Oceania, 
Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean each get two. The last seat is reserved for Eastern 
Europe.”54 Non-permanent members are elected for terms of two years.55 Furthermore, each 
member nation has one vote on matters presented to the Security Council, and “matters shall be 
made by an affirmative vote of nine members.”56 Therefore, it is necessary to have at least nine 
nations recognize a crisis as a genocide in order for the UN to take any action. In addition to 
needing nine votes, each member of the Permanent Five holds veto power and can vote against 
any issue, especially if they do not find it in their national interest to intervene. 
 Perhaps the most significant difference between the Security Council and the General 
Assembly is that 
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in contrast to the decisions made by the General Assembly, all 
Member States are obligated under the UN Charter to carry out the 
Security Council’s decisions… Security Council decisions are 
formal expressions of the will of the Council. In contrast to the 
decisions taken by the General Assembly, those taken by the 
Security Council are legally binding. As Article 25 of the UN 
Charter states, ‘The Members of the United Nations agree to 
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in 
accordance with the present Charter.57  
 
 The Security Council is therefore expected to enforce its decisions in the international 
community. In order to maintain international peace, the Security Council refrains from using 
military force whenever possible.  
When the Council considers a threat to international peace, it first 
explores ways to settle the dispute peacefully. It may suggest 
principles to the parties for a peaceful settlement, appoint special 
representatives, ask the Secretary-General to use his good offices, or 
undertake investigation and mediation. It has developed and refined 
the use of non-military measures including arms embargoes, travel 
banks, and restrictions to guard against the exploitation of natural 
resources to fuel conflicts, as well as taking a lead role in the 
coordination of international counter-terrorism efforts. In the event 
that a dispute has erupted into armed conflict, the Council tries to 
secure a ceasefire. It may send a peacekeeping mission to help the 
parties maintain the truce and to keep opposing forces apart...The 
Council may, in some cases, authorize the utilization of military force 
by a coalition of member states or by a regional organization or 
arrangement. This can only be carried out as a last resort when all 
possible peaceful means of settling a dispute have been exhausted, or 
after a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression 
have been determined to exist.58 
 
The Security Council holds far more power than any other organ of the UN by design. In order to 
be truly effective in promoting and protecting international peace and security, the Council must 
be endowed with the ability to do so. The decisions made by the Security Council, therefore, are 
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legally binding. Such decisions can only be made, however, as long as no member of the 
Permanent Five uses the veto power.  
Unfortunately, the use of the veto power is too often used in cases of severe human rights 
violations, crippling the ability of the UN to act and save lives. According to the Global Center 
for the Responsibility to Protect, “Since October 2011 the veto has been exercised twelve times 
by two of the UNSC's permanent members – Russia (twelve) and China – (six, plus one 
abstention) on resolutions meant to address crimes against humanity and war crimes committed 
against the Syrian people.”59 The purely self-interested use of the veto power primarily by Russia 
or China, or in some cases the United States, paralyzes the rest of the UN and Security Council 
from acting in an appropriate manner to prevent and end genocide and mass killings. It is almost 
impossible to get the nine affirmative votes needed to intervene in genocide when nations with 
long histories of poor human rights records possess the veto power. The human rights record of 
Russia and China are particularly dismal. Both nations perpetrated genocides in the 20th century 
that claimed the lives of tens of millions of targeted victims. The Soviet Union claimed millions 
of lives in gulags, and Mao killed millions in the Great Leap Forward in China. Even today there 
is a suspected genocide of the Uyghur Muslims in China.  
In recent years, several nations have started a movement to limit the veto power of the 
Permanent Five in order to ensure that the organization has the ability to take action in the case 
of genocide. The Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect states that “Over 120 
governments - in addition to two UN observer missions - have supported calls for veto restraint 
or a code of conduct.”60  One initiative is the ACT Code of Conduct. ACT stands for 
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Accountability, Coherence, and Transparency group. The group’s code of conduct, introduced in 
2015, encourages all members of the Security Council, particularly the Permanent Five, “to not 
vote against any credible draft resolution intended to prevent or halt mass atrocities.”61 As of 
June 2019, 117 nations signed onto the Code of Conduct with 2 observers.62 Out of these 119 
nations, the United Kingdom and France were the only members of the Permanent Five to sign 
the Code of Conduct.63 Russia, China, and the United States have yet to commit to not using the 
veto power when there is credible evidence of severe human rights violations that require 
intervention. On this same note, there is also the France/Mexico Initiative. The General 
Assembly resolution, proposed by France and Mexico, states “that the Security Council should 
not be prevented by the use of veto from taking action with the aim of preventing or bringing an 
end to situations involving the commission of mass atrocities… the veto is not a privilege, but an 
international responsibility.”64 These two initiatives are representative of how the structure and 
decision making process of the Security Council is not efficient and must be amended in order 
for the Security Council, and subsequently the UN as a whole, to carry out its mission.  
 
The Genocide Convention  
 An integral part of the United Nations establishment was the adoption of the Genocide 
Convention in order to ensure that an atrocity like the Holocaust would never happen again.  The 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was ratified by the UN 
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General Assembly in December 1948 and came into effect in January 1951.65 Along with 
establishing the official definition for genocide, the Genocide Convention laid out specific rules 
and guidelines for how the UN should confront and stop genocide. Article III of the Genocide 
Convention states that  
The following acts shall be punishable:  
(a) Genocide;  
(b) Conspiracy to commit Genocide; 
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; 
(d) Attempt to commit genocide  
(e) Complicity in genocide.66  
 
Article IV asserts that any person that commits any of the acts stated in Article III “shall be 
punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, or private 
individuals.”67 The convention states that anyone violating the punishable acts will be tried in an 
international tribunal. 68 The convention does not state, however, any mechanisms for 
enforcement, just how perpetrators will be punished. The only means of prevention that the 
convention articulates is in Article VII which states, “any Contracting Party may call upon the 
competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United 
Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide.”69 
The document does not detail the exact process in which preventative actions would be taken. 
Instead, it assigns responsibility to the signatories to report any concerns to the United Nations in 
order to initiate investigation which may or may not precipitate action.  
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In addition to a commitment to punish perpetrators of genocide, Article V states that 
“The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, 
the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention, and, in 
particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts 
enumerated in article III.”70 Through this article, it is clear that the UN does not claim to hold the 
sole responsibility for preventing genocide. Instead, the primary responsibility lies with the 
member states to enforce domestic laws that protect minorities against violence and eliminate 
corruption in government that leads to human rights violations. The primary authority and ability 
to, first, prevent genocide, and second, to report genocide, lies with each individual nation that is 
a signatory of the convention.  
 A controversial aspect of the Genocide Convention, stated in Article II, reads that 
“genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, 
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”71 The issue with this statement is defining what 
exactly intent entails. The United National Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility 
to Protect states,  
the intent is the most difficult element to determine. To constitute 
genocide, there must be a proven intent on the part of perpetrators 
to physically destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. 
Cultural destruction does not suffice, nor does an intention to 
simply disperse a group. It is this special intent, or dolus specialis, 
that makes the crime of genocide so unique. In addition, case law 
has associated intent with the existence of a State or organizational 
plan or policy, even if the definition of genocide in international 
law does not include that element.72 
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Intent is the most important aspect to the crime of genocide. Despite its importance, the official 
definition of intent is quite ambiguous. Intent is so crucial to the prosecution of the crime of 
genocide because determining what constitutes genocide cannot depend solely on numbers. 
There exists no specific number of deaths that automatically classify a mass murder as genocide. 
This is why discovering and proving intent is a necessary step in determining genocide. Intent 
needs to be looked at in relation to deaths in order to come to an accurate conclusion. Kai Ambos 
explains the some of the relationship between intent and numbers in his journal article titled 
“What Does ‘Intent to Destroy’ in Genocide Mean?” in the International Review of the Red 
Cross. Ambos provides an example by stating that “the genocidaire may intend more than he is 
realistically able to accomplish. A case in point would be a white racist who intends to destroy 
the group of black people in a large city but, acting alone, will only be able to kill a few members 
of this group.”73 This is a very basic example that illustrates intent alone, but not genocide. The 
perpetrator does not and cannot kill enough people to amount to the level of genocide, so instead 
he would be charged with manslaughter. Despite that, the intent of killing an entire race drives 
his motives and is clear in the crime.  
Furthermore, intent is the most important aspect to look at when determining genocide 
because genocide is “‘characterized by a psychological relationship between the physical result 
and the mental state of the perpetrator.’”74 Intent is so hard to prove because it naturally relates to 
the frame of mind of the perpetrator, and that is something that is hard to obtain physical 
evidence of. It is clear, however, that genocide is a crime conducted on a large scale, which also 
points to the seriousness of the crime. It is this specific end goal of eliminating a whole group of 
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people simply because of who they are that defines genocide and sets it apart from other grave 
human rights violations such as ethnic cleansing and mass murder.  
The language in the Genocide Convention that addresses intent and its definition is quite 
ambiguous. The United States, for example, did not even become a signatory of the convention 
until 1988 after decades of tense debates. Many senators feared that the loose language of the 
legislation could violate national sovereignty. The primary source of confusion lies with the 
phrasing, “intent to destroy, in whole or in part.” Critics of the Convention in the United States 
Senate, including the American Bar Association in the 1950s through 1970s, argued that this 
language in Article II raised “all sorts of questions about what constitutes part of a group.”75 The 
confusion in the interpretation of intent was of great interest to the United States Congress. 
Depending on what the definition of intent to destroy a group was, the Genocide Convention 
could be “applicable to lynchings and race riots in the United States but not to genocide against 
national and other groups behind the Iron Curtain.”76 This is where a fear of infringement on 
national sovereignty came into play. Furthermore, inconsistent definitions of genocide could 
result from this vagueness in the language, which would also result in inconsistent intervention 
and prosecution. Raphael Lemkin argued in letters to the Senate in the 1950s, however, that the 
language of the legislation was clear in its implications. Lemkin “took pains to point out that it 
was intended to apply to large numbers of people, that the ‘destruction in part must be of a 
substantial nature… so as to affect the entirety.”77 Evidence of intent, therefore, must encompass 
targeted damage large enough to considerably affect the security and welfare of the entire group. 
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Labeling anything less than that as genocide could seriously harm the mission of prevention by 
stripping genocide of the unique and defining nature of the crime. This specific intent places 
genocide above mass murder and ethnic cleansing, and it is what makes it so crucial to prevent. 
Defining intent is a necessary step in preventing and prosecuting genocide.  
 It is clear that there exist numerous obstacles to proving intent, which makes coming to 
such a conclusion difficult. For example, the United Nations’ failure to intervene and stop the 
genocide in Darfur that began in 2003 is infamous. In 2004 the UN set up the UN International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur in order to investigate reports of genocide and come to a 
conclusion on the matter. 78 The report did not find conclusive evidence to convict the Sudanese 
government of genocide. In fact, the report stated that “the crucial element of genocidal intent 
appears to be missing.”79 The commission concluded that intent could not be proved because 
“the policy of attacking, killing and forcibly displacing members of some tribes does not evince a 
specific intent to annihilate, in whole or in part, a group.”80 The actus reus of genocide, which 
includes “killing, or causing serious bodily or mental harm, or deliberately inflicting conditions 
of life likely to bring about physical destruction,” was clearly evident in Darfur.81 The 
commission could not follow through with a charge of genocide, however, because they deemed 
that the crucial aspect of intent was not clear. While intent may be clear in some cases, such as 
the meticulous records that the Nazis kept in the Holocaust, it is more likely that perpetrators of 
genocide do not specifically document their intentions. The Sudanese government targeted and 
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killed over 400,000 innocent men, women, and children. Despite the high death toll, the crime 
was not declared a genocide by the UN because, in their opinion, intent was unclear.82  
 As of May 2019, the Genocide Convention has been ratified by 151 States, while 43 
states have neglected to ratify the Convention.83 Out of those 43 states 20 are from Africa, 16 
from Asia, and 6 from the Americas.84 States that have yet to ratify the Genocide Convention, 
however, are still held to its terms. 
 
Human Rights Council and UN Membership 
 The UN Human Rights Council is full of contradictions. The UN Human Rights Council 
was officially implemented as an integral part of the UN system in March 2006 through the 
adoption of Resolution 60/251.85 It was established as an effort to replace the largely ineffective 
Commission of Human Rights that was part of the UN since its inception. Unfortunately, it is 
clear that many of the same problems still plague the present Human Rights Council. The 
General Assembly directly elects the members through secret ballots by a simple majority. There 
are 47 members of the Council that serve on a staggered three year rotation.86 When electing 
members, “the General Assembly takes into account the candidate States’ contribution to the 
promotion and protection of human rights, as well as their voluntary pledges and commitments 
in this regard.”87 Membership on the council, similar to the Security Council, is divided by 
region. There are 13 seats for African states, 13 seats for Asia-Pacific states, 8 seats for Latin 
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American and Caribbean states, 7 seats for Western European and other states, and 6 seats for 
Eastern European states.88 This required allocation of seats for each region is counterproductive 
to the mission of the Council because Africa and Asia hold far more influence on the Council. 
This is inherently contradictory because these are the regions of the world “with the weakest 
records of promoting and protecting human rights.”89  
Membership on the Human Rights Council also carries with it “a responsibility to uphold 
high human rights standards.”90 It would seem natural that states elected to the Human Rights 
Council because of their commitment to the cause would have no issue upholding basic 
standards of human rights. This, however, is not the case. With membership of nations that 
perpetrate gross human rights abuses, such as China, Sudan, North Korea, and Venezuela, just to 
name a few, it is clear that the Human Rights Council is far from functioning properly. There are 
no criteria that a nation must meet to be a member of the Human Rights Council, and “even 
states under Security Council sanction for human rights violations are eligible for HRC 
membership.”91  This illustrates that the Human Rights Council does not truly value human 
rights. States that receive condemnation from the Security Council should not be eligible for a 
seat on the Human Rights Council. Furthermore, “Burma, China, Cuba, North Korea, Sudan, and 
Zimbabwe are UN members in good standing despite extensive and well-documented instances 
of human rights violations.”92 Universal membership in the UN makes it possible for these 
nations to have influence in the HRC. This speaks to the inability of the UN as a whole to uphold 
its values, one of those being a commitment to the prevention of genocide.  
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 The Human Rights Council is defined as “the principle intergovernmental body within 
the United Nations system responsible for strengthening the promotion and protection of human 
rights around the globe, and for addressing and taking action on human rights violations around 
the globe.”93 The Council meets in Geneva at least 10 weeks out of the year, but is also 
authorized to meet on short notice to address urgent human rights situations.94 Genocide 
irrefutably falls under the wide umbrella of human rights violations; therefore, the HRC is very 
important to look at in relation to genocide.  
 Despite the goals of the Human Rights Council, the responsibility to prevent or intervene 
in genocide still falls primarily on the Security Council because it is the only body in the UN that 
can produce resolutions that carry legal weight. The focus of the HRC regarding genocide, 
therefore, focuses largely on promoting the responsibility to protect. The HRC has, however, 
called emergency sessions to consider volatile situations in “Burundi, the Central African 
Republic, Cote d’lvoire, Darfur, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, 
Myanmar, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, and Syria.”95 The HRC 
recognized the dire situations in these nations as important enough to warrant a meeting of the 
Council. Unfortunately, the resolutions that the Human Rights Council produces only have the 
ability to influence through rhetoric. 
 Examining the membership of the Human Rights Council is essential in understanding 
some of the main structural problems within the UN system. One of the most debilitating factors 
that plagues the HRC is “the ability of nations that do not observe human rights to manipulate 
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the system and vulnerability to political manipulation designed to undermine their focus.”96 The 
presence of nations with poor human rights records on the HRC is inherently counterproductive 
to the stated mission of the body. Such nations “routinely use their influence… to blunt efforts to 
hold them accountable for their human rights failures.”97 It is impossible for the HRC, or the UN 
as a whole, to accomplish its goals when it allows universal membership and participation of 
nations that do not uphold the values that the UN professes. This is made particularly worse 
when such nations are allowed influence on the Human Rights Council.   
 
Responsibility to Protect 
 The doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect is now one of the driving ideas in the 
international fight against genocide. The idea of the responsibility to protect was introduced in 
2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which the 
Canadian government organized.98 The relatively recent international failures in Rwanda, 
Kosovo, and Srebrenica, largely influenced the group to publish a report titled “The 
Responsibility to Protect.”99 A central focus of the report is that state sovereignty inherently 
carries with it the responsibility to protect citizens and ensure the general welfare.100 The report 
states that the responsibility to protect entails “the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility 
to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from 
starvation – but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne 
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by the broader community of states.”101 This reinforces the principle set forth in Article V of the 
Genocide Convention that each signatory is responsible for enacting legislation in their own 
nation to protect against genocide.  
The core principles of the responsibility to protect still recognize the necessary role of the 
UN Security Council in mass atrocity intervention. For example, the second foundation of the 
responsibility to protect is “the responsibility of the Security Council, under Article 24 of the UN 
Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security.”102 While this report was not 
commissioned by the United Nations, it still asserts the importance of the Security Council in 
international law. The report discusses the three elements of the responsibility to protect. These 
include the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react, and the responsibility to rebuild. 
Out of these three, “prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to 
protect.”103 It is obvious that the best course of action in dealing with genocide is to prevent it 
from occurring in the first place. The responsibility to react is also paramount. States must 
“respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include 
coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military 
intervention.”104 The report, therefore, includes thresholds to determine if military intervention is 
necessary. This includes the military intervening to stop ethnic cleansing or large-scale loss of 
life, and it is also a last resort when all other methods fail to stop the violence.105 Regarding the 
Security Council, the report states that 
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there is no better or more appropriate body than the United Nations 
Security Council to authorize military intervention for human 
protection purposes. The task is not to find alternatives to the 
Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the Security 
Council work better than it has. 106 
 
Furthermore, the report states that prior to any military intervention there should be a request for  
Security Council authorization. On that same note, however, the responsibility to protect declares 
that the Security Council needs to act quickly and swiftly to address concerns for intervention 
when a member state raises concern. Along with that, an additional central concern for the 
responsibility to protect is that the Permanent Five of the Security Council commit to not using 
their veto power “to obstruct the passage of resolution authorizing military intervention for 
human protection purposes for which there is otherwise majority support.”107 This is key to 
ensuring that Russia and China do not use the veto power to prevent intervention in nations 
where genocide is occurring.  
 The responsibility to protect is important because it reinforces the primary role that each 
nation has in the prevention of genocide. On that same note, it is a political, not legal concept.108 
It aims to change the narrative of intervention in genocide, not through legal means, but through 
each state stepping up and accepting its responsibility to prevent genocide in its own borders and 
around the world. The adoption of these ideas would provide much needed political momentum 
that would spur action in other nations in the face of a mass killings.109 By prompting action, the 
responsibility to protect further asserts that nations will not get away with perpetrating genocide. 
The doctrine “powerfully rejects the argument that sovereignty shields them from international 
 
106 Evans and Sahnoun, xii. 
107 Evans and Sahnoun, xiii. 
108 Waxman, Matthew. “Intervention to Stop Genocide and Mass Atrocities.” Council on Foreign 
Relations, October 2009, 10.  
109 Waxman, 10.  
 Haller 33 
concern.”110 The responsibility to protect does not seek to violate a state’s sovereignty. Instead, it 
asserts that with true sovereignty comes responsibility, an integral part of which is a commitment 
to preventing genocide. The responsibility to protect asserts each member state of the United 
Nations must accept the responsibility that accompanies sovereignty. This acceptance of 
responsibility is essential in efforts for the prevention of genocide.  
 The General Assembly, Security Council, Genocide Convention, Human Rights Council, 
UN membership, and the Responsibility to Protect are all aspects of the UN that significantly 
influence how the organization approaches genocide prevention and intervention. There are clear 
fundamental problems with these six organs that inhibit the UN’s ability to act in the face of 
genocide. The subsequent chapters will illustrate three separate instances in which structural 
components of the UN, stemming from these six elements, led to UN failures and massive loss of 
life.  
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Case Study: Rwanda 
 The most notable failure of the UN to intervene and prevent genocide occurred in 
Rwanda in 1994. There is no doubt that the UN did not fulfil its responsibility to protect human 
rights across the globe. The Hutu government brutally murdered over 800,000 men, women, and 
children in Rwanda over the course of just 100 days.111 Aside from the Holocaust, the Rwandan 
Genocide is perhaps the most famous mass atrocity in the world. It was also a glaring mark on 
the UN’s reputation as the international agency dedicated to the prevention of violence. The UN 
stated that the international community, including the organization itself, is at fault because it 
“did not prevent the genocide, nor did it stop the killing once the genocide had begun.”112 
Examining the failure in Rwanda, and the aftermath of that failure, is essential in understanding 
how the structural impediments of the UN allowed this tragedy to occur. 
 There was not a stable political situation in Rwanda prior to the genocide. The tensions 
between the Hutu and Tutsi existed long before 1994. Rwanda had been under Belgium control 
until 1962.113 Under Belgian rule, the Tutsi “who made up 15 percent of the populace, had 
enjoyed privileged status.”114 Once Rwanda became independent, however, the Tutsi became a 
minority that the Hutu despised. The Hutu came to power after Rwanda secured her 
independence in 1962, and the “Tutsi were systematically discriminated against and periodically 
subjected to waves of killing and ethnic cleansing.”115 The years of colonial influence in Rwanda 
created deep divides between the two ethnic groups because of how the Belgians favored the 
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Tutsi. This led to the Hutu viewing the Tutsi as enemies as opposed to fellow Rwandans. Once 
the Hutu gained political power, they began imposing public policies to oppress the Tutsi. 
Beginning in the 1990s Tutsi rebels, who had been forced out of Rwanda during years of ethnic 
cleansing following independence, formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The RPF fought 
against the Hutu government forces for several years, illustrating the instability that plagued 
Rwanda. In an effort to remedy the situation, major Western powers and Tanzania drafted the 
Arusha accords in August 1993.116 The agreement assured power sharing in the government 
between the Hutu and Tutsi parties. The UN was involved because the agreement provided that 
“UN peacekeepers would be deployed to patrol a cease-fire and assist in demilitarization and 
demobilization as well as to help provide a secure environment, so that exiled Tutsi could 
return.”117 The Arusha accords did not hold up for very long. The tensions between the Hutu and 
Tutsi were so entrenched that the Hutu were afraid to relinquish any power to the Tutsi. The 
Hutu held all political power in  Rwanda since independence, “and they were afraid that the 
Tutsi, who had long been persecuted, would respond in kind if given the chance again to 
govern.”118 Furthermore, “the accord did not grant past killers amnesty for their misdeeds.”119 
Powerful Hutu leaders were adamantly opposed to having Tutsi officials in the government and 
military out of a fear of being held responsible for prior crimes against the Tutsi. It was clear that 
the Arusha accords did not solve the problems in Rwanda because they did not address the 
underlying issues between ethnic groups.  
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Only a week after both parties signed the accords, the UN released a report “which gave 
an ominously serious picture of the human rights situation in Rwanda.”120 Waly Bacre Ndiaye, 
the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions, visited Rwanda in April 1993.121 The human rights situation was so poor 
that “the targeting of the Tutsi population led Ndiaye to discuss whether the term genocide might 
be applicable.”122 In response to the human rights abuses he witnessed, Ndiaye “recommended a 
series of steps to prevent further massacres and other abuses.”123 A 1999 UN inquiry into 
Rwanda, however, states that “his report seems to have been largely ignored by the key actors 
within the United Nations system.”124 The UN website for the Outreach Program on the Rwanda 
Genocide states that it was only after October 1993 that “evidence demonstrated irrefutably that 
extremist elements of the Hutu majority while talking peace were in fact planning a campaign to 
exterminate Tutsis and moderate Hutus.”125 A UN official warned of genocide an entire year 
before the genocide officially began. Despite that, the UN as a whole simply ignored the credible 
warnings as the situation devolved into chaos.  
In addition to the warnings about a potential genocide, the RPF requested UN aid in 
implementing the agreement. In response, the UN sent a reconnaissance mission led by General 
Romeo Dallaire to Rwanda in August 1993 to gather information about what would be needed to 
secure the peace process.126 The Hutu government and the RPF both requested from the 
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Secretary-General “the rapid deployment of the international force and the rapid establishment of 
the transitional institutions.”127 Both sides feared that the peace process would quickly fail 
without international forces, so they requested a force of 4,260.128 The Secretary-General was 
unable fulfil this appeal because the UN was in the middle of a “financial crisis” and there was a 
significant lack of resources.129 The Government and the RPF, therefore, “had to rely on 
themselves during the interim period.”130 This request by the joint Government and RPF 
delegation clearly showed that the situation in Rwanda was still far from peaceful, and the UN 
was not properly resourced to ensure peace.  
Nevertheless, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) began in 
October 1993 with General Dallaire as the commander of the mission. The UN deployed “a 
peacekeeping force of 2,548 military personnel” with plans to reduce the mission to “1,428 
military personnel” as they believed the situation in Rwanda would improve.131 In November 
1993, Dallaire drafted a “Rules of Engagement for UNAMIR” and sent it to the Secretariat for 
approval.132 The 1999 Independent Inquiry states that “the draft included in paragraph 17 a rule 
specifically allowing the mission to act, and even to use force, in response to crimes against 
humanity and other abuses.”133 Dallaire’s draft explained that “there may also be ethnically or 
politically motivated criminal acts committed during this mandate which will morally and legally 
require UNAMIR to use all available means to halt them.”134 Instead of heeding Dallaire’s 
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warning and granting him permission to use force when necessary, the UN never even responded 
to his request.135 A large part of why the UN failed in Rwanda was “because the UN suffered 
from the ‘destructive misconception’ that these types of limited and impartial peacekeeping 
operations can keep peace where none exits.”136 Peace cannot be achieved in a situation where 
both sides do not want it. In the case of Rwanda, the Hutu were set on their genocidal mission of 
eliminating the Tutsi. Therefore, peacekeeping without the use of force was all but impossible. 
The UN’s failure to authorize use of force ultimately crippled the mission. This failure to 
respond, both to Dallaire and Ndiaye, is a good illustration of the UN’s lack of preparedness to 
address and prevent an impending genocide. Credible warnings about impending genocides 
should not be able to go unanswered in a body that is dedicated to human rights and mass 
atrocity prevention.   
 Following months of instability and violence, the Rwandan Genocide began on April 6, 
1994 when missiles shot down President Juvenal Habyarimana’s plane.137 The situation in 
Rwanda worsened dramatically immediately following the death of the President. The Hutu were 
clearly prepared to orchestrate the genocide because “less than half an hour after the plane crash, 
roadblocks manned by Hutu militiamen…were set up to identify Tutsis.”138 The day after the 
crash, powerful Hutu “aired a broadcast attributing the plane crash to the RPF and a contingent 
of UN soldiers.”139 The warning signs of genocide were finally coming to fruition in Rwanda.  
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In the same way as the Holocaust, Myanmar, and other genocides, the perpetrators used 
dehumanizing language to describe their targets early on in the violence. Over the Hutu radio 
station, Radio Mille Collines, the Hutus “named ethnic Tutsi... ‘cockroaches’ the targets.”140 
Furthermore, on April 7th, “Hutu gunmen in the presidential guard…systematically tracked down 
and eliminated virtually all of Rwanda’s moderate politicians.”141 There is no doubt that the 
ruthless attacks committed were painstakingly planned by the Hutu extremists in the 
government. There is clear evidence of genocidal intent on behalf of the Hutu. Power states that 
“The Rwandan genocide would prove to be the fastest, most efficient killing spree of the 
twentieth century. In 100 days, some 800,000 Tutsi and politically moderate Hutu were 
murdered.”142 The Nazis planned and executed the Holocaust with a similar level of 
organization. For example, both the Hutu and the Nazis created a registry of their victims. The 
Nazis, like the Hutu, used dehumanizing language and propaganda to encourage violence against 
their targets. Such efficient killing does not happen without a high degree of planning.  
In the years before the genocide began, “guns, grenades, and machetes began arriving by 
the planeload… one machete for every third adult Hutu male.”143 The Hutu deliberately armed 
their cause well in advance, preparing themselves for the genocide. The Hutu did not attempt to 
hide their intentions of eradicating the Tutsi from Rwanda. Just like in the Holocaust, the 
ideology of genocide strongly drove the Hutu killers. In his book, We Wish to Inform You that 
Tomorrow We Will be Killed with Our Families, Philip Gourevitch elaborates on this. He states 
that “Mass violence… must be organized; it does not occur aimlessly…and great and sustained 
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destruction requires great ambition. It must be conceived as the means toward achieving a new 
order.”144 This clearly illustrates evidence of intent in the Rwandan genocide. The ideology that 
drove the genocide was that the Tutsi were subhuman and did not deserve to live. Gourevitch 
states that “what is required above all is that they want their victims dead. They have to want it 
so badly that they consider it a necessity.” This need to cleanse society drives mass violence, and 
it was evident in every genocide from Armenia to the Holocaust to Myanmar. The need to 
eradicate an entire group of people simply because of who they are demonstrates genocidal 
intent, and there is ample evidence to prove genocidal intent by the Hutu extremists in Rwanda. 
For example, Gourevitch states that “the dead had seen their killers training as militias in the 
weeks before the end, and it was well known that they were training to kill Tutsis; it was 
announced on the radio, it was in the newspapers, people spoke of it openly.”145 There is no 
question, therefore, that there was genocidal intent. This alone violates the Genocide Convention.  
This shows clear evidence of intent well before the actual killing began.  
Eventually, “the situation deteriorated dramatically enough for… UN bodies to take 
interest.”146 The UN, therefore, was keenly aware of the dangerously unstable situation in 
Rwanda prior to the escalation of violence. Furthermore, the UN’s “March 1993 report found 
that more than 10,000 Tutsi had been detained and 2,000 murdered… Government supported 
killers had carried out at least three major massacres of Tutsi. The international commission and 
a UN rapporteur who soon followed warned explicitly of a possible genocide.”147 The 1999 
inquiry into the actions of the UN in Rwanda further states that the International Criminal 
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Tribunal for Rwanda “determined that the mass killings of Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994 constituted 
genocide. It was a genocide planned and incited by Hutu extremists against the Tutsi.”148 While 
the UN concluded that the Hutus conducted a genocide after the fact, the UN was unable to heed 
the many warning signs before the violence began.  
 This 1999 report, commissioned by then Secretary-General Kofi Annan, was titled 
“Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 
Genocide in Rwanda.” It was conducted in order to “establish the truth about the role of the 
United Nations during the genocide.”149 The introduction to the report states that 
“acknowledgement of responsibility must also be accompanied by a will for change: a 
commitment to ensure that catastrophes such as the genocide in Rwanda never occur anywhere 
in the future.”150 The report explains what the UN detailed would be necessary to prevent future 
atrocities. It states that “the fundamental failure was the lack of resources and political 
commitment devoted to developments in Rwanda and to the United Nations’ presence there. 
There was a persistent lack of political will by Member States to act, or to act with enough 
assertiveness.”151 Member states did not possess the will to act likely because they “saw no 
reason to care much about what happened in faraway Rwanda.”152 The lack of resources was 
evident from the very beginning of the violence. In a journal article titled “The UN Security 
Council, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda,” Michael Barnett, former official at the U.S. 
Mission to the United Nations that followed Rwanda, states that in the first few days of conflict 
Belgian forces “were running dangerously low on fuel, water and food… resupplying them was 
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becoming increasingly questionable as the airport became a major battleground.”153 Due to the 
complicated dynamic between the ethnic groups in Rwanda, there were essentially two wars 
occurring simultaneously; one between the Hutu against the Tutsi, and a civil war with the Hutu 
government and the RPF.154 As a result of this and the lack of heeding early warnings about the 
conflict, UN forces were “meager and badly supplied.”155 
 The decision to withdraw UN troops is perhaps the most notable decision by the UN 
during the genocide in Rwanda. First, the Belgians extracted their troops following the savage 
massacre of ten Belgian soldiers.156 The Belgians were Dallaire’s best soldiers, and their brutal 
murders left him “‘truly stunned.’”157 Dallaire then had a dire need for well-trained and capable 
troops. The United States, however, was completely opposed to military involvement in Rwanda. 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated in 1994,  
the international community must give highest priority to full, 
orderly withdrawal of all UNAMIR personnel as soon as 
possible… We will oppose any effort at this time to preserve a 
UNAMIR presence in Rwanda… Our opposition to retaining a 
UNAMIR presence in Rwanda is firm. It is based on our 
conviction that the Security Council has an obligation to ensure 
that peacekeeping operations are viable, that they are capable of 
fulfilling their mandates, and that UN peacekeeping personnel are 
not placed or retained, knowingly, in an untenable situation.158 
 
The American opposition to peacekeeping troops was very influential and significant in the UN’s 
decision to withdraw from Rwanda. The United States saw the mission in Rwanda as a lost 
cause, especially after the Belgian troops’ departure. Dallaire’s few peacekeepers, however, had 
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a strong “deterrent effect.”159 Power states that the soldiers “scoured Kigali, rescuing Tutsi, and 
later established defensive positions in the city, opening their doors to the fortunate Tutsi… It did 
not take many UN soldiers to dissuade the Hutu from attacking.”160 The presence of UN 
peacekeepers was vital in order to protect the Tutsi because of the deterrent power that the 
soldiers possessed. Hutu militia generally did not attack areas with a UN presence. Instead, they 
focused their resources on killing unarmed Tutsi who could not put up a fight. Even if the Hutu 
militia persisted in attacking an area manned by peacekeepers, those peacekeepers putting up a 
fight would inevitably delay the Hutu’s efforts. For example, in his book International Security 
Problems and Solutions, Patrick Morgan states that “a frenzy can often be stopped if a pause is 
imposed, if even modest resistance appears.”161 Therefore, even if the presence of UN soldiers 
did not completely dissuade the Hutu, it would likely slow them down. Despite Dallaire’s pleas 
for more soldiers, the UN reduced UNAMIR's number of troops to 2,100 without the Belgian 
troops.162 Ultimately, Dallaire was left with only 270 peacekeepers to protect the thousands of 
Tutsi from the Hutu government.163 Power states that with this decision, “the UN Security 
Council now made a decision that sealed the Tutsi’s fate and signaled to the Hutu militia that 
they would have free reign.”164 Despite being “’appalled at the ensuing large-scale violence in 
Rwanda, which has resulted in the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians,” the Security 
Council still “voted unanimously to reduce UNAMIR to about 270 and to change the mission’s 
mandate.”165 Removing such a significant portion of the UN troops sent an emboldening 
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message to the Hutu killers that they could continue killing without intervention. Naturally, the 
Hutu did just that.  
 Despite the bleak situation, Dallaire still held onto the hope that the UN, particularly the 
Security Council, would realize the extent of the violence in Rwanda. He hoped that the Security 
Council would send more troops in order to prevent genocide and fulfil the mission of “never 
again.” At the time of the genocide, Rwanda held one of the rotating seats on the Council. This 
was naturally a significant barrier to securing both attention and aid for the situation in Rwanda. 
While a rotating member of the Council is only a member for two years and does not hold nearly 
as much power as a member of the Permanent Five, the presence of that nation can still play a 
significant role in decision-making. Power states that despite Rwanda’s role on the Security 
Council, “neither the United States nor any other UN member state ever suggested that the 
representative of the genocidal government be expelled from the council.”166 Rwanda’s presence 
on the Security Council complicated the ability of the Council to effectively address the blatant 
genocide in Rwanda. For example, the Security Council adopted a resolution in May 1994 that 
“included a decision to increase the number of troops in UNAMIR, and imposed an arms 
embargo on Rwanda. Rwanda voted against the latter decision, a clear example of the 
problematic issue of principle raised by the Rwandan membership of the Council.”167 The 
structure of the Security Council hindered its ability to effectively deal with the situation in 
Rwanda. Furthermore, Rwanda’s presence on the Security Council gave the Hutu government an 
unfair advantage in attempting to influence the decisions of other nations on the Council for their 
own benefit.168 The inquiry states that Member States felt “that the Rwandan presence hampered 
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the quality of the information that the Secretariat felt it possible to provide to the Council and the 
nature of the discussion in that body.”169 Therefore, members of the Security Council should 
have requested the removal of Rwanda from the Council. This alone is very telling of the apathy 
or cluelessness of the member states, and the UN as a whole, to the brutal genocide that occurred 
right before their eyes.  
 The UN accepts full responsibility for its utter failure to prevent the genocide in Rwanda. 
The conclusion of the 1999 Independent Inquiry is that the responsibility for the failure “lies 
with a number of different actors, in particular the Secretary-General, the Secretariat, the 
Security Council, UNAMIR, and the broader membership of the United Nations.”170 The inquiry 
also found that the failure “can be summarized as a lack of resources and a lack of will to take on 
the commitment which would have been necessary to prevent or to stop the genocide.”171 The 
lack of political will from powerful member states is very clearly a significant reason why the 
genocide in Rwanda proceeded at the rate it did. The inquiry further states that  
the lack of will to act in response to the crisis in Rwanda becomes 
all the more deplorable in the light of the reluctance by key 
members of the International Community to acknowledge that the 
mass murder being pursued in front of global media was a 
genocide. The fact that what was occurring was a genocide brought 
with it a key international obligation to act in order to stop the 
killing. The parties to the 1948 Convention took upon themselves a 
responsibility to prevent and punish the crime of 
genocide….Although the main action required of the parties to the 
Convention is to enact national legislation to provide for 
jurisdiction against genocide, the Convention also explicitly opens 
the opportunity of bringing a situation to the Security Council.172  
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No Member States truly cared enough to stop the genocide. This is evidenced by the fact that no 
Member States brought the issue before the Security Council to prompt action. States hesitated to 
describe the events as a genocides despite the fact that “television was broadcasting pictures of 
bloated corpses floating down the river from Rwanda.”173 The inquiry also concluded that “if 
there is ever to be effective international action against genocide, states must be prepared to 
identify situations as such, and to assume the responsibility to act that accompanies that 
definition.”174 Member states were not interested in providing troops and materials for 
UNAMIR. The Secretariat worked diligently for weeks to collect contributions, but few states 
were willing to help.175 The inquiry states, “the political will of Member States to send troops to 
peacekeeping operations is of course a key to the United Nations capacity to react to conflict.” 
The UN was severely handicapped by the “unwillingness of  member states to respond to the 
changed circumstances in Rwanda by strengthening UNAMIR’s mandate and contributing 
additional troops.”176  
While the structure of the UN often impedes action, it is ultimately up to the member 
nations to ensure that the UN is able to function. Rwanda’s location is a likely reason for the 
passivity of many member states because “Rwanda was not of strategic interest” to many 
nations.177 As a result, nations were far less likely to divert resources to a country that is of little 
interest to them. It could also be difficult to draw up popular support for involvement. Because of 
its structure and charter, the UN is not set up like a government that can actually enforce requests 
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and mandates. If member states refuse to contribute, the UN has no other options. For example, 
the United States’ refusal to get involved significantly influenced the inaction of the UN. In light 
of the U.S. failure in Somalia, Richard Clarke, a member of the National Security Council under 
President Clinton, drafted a presidential decision directive. This directive, PDD-25, severely 
limited the scope of the United States’ involvement in peacekeeping missions. PDD-25  
listed sixteen factors that policymakers needed to consider when 
deciding whether to support peacekeeping activities: seven factors 
if the United States was to vote in the UN Security Council on 
peace operations carried out by non-American soldiers, six 
additional and more stringent factors if U.S. forces were to 
participate in UN peacekeeping missions, and three final factors if 
U.S. troop were likely to engage in actual combat.178  
 
In order for the U.S. to partake in peacekeeping operations, therefore, “U.S. participation had to 
advance U.S. interests, be necessary for the operation’s success, and garner domestic and 
congressional support. The risk of casualties had to be ‘acceptable.’”179 This ultimately directed 
U.S.  foreign policy in relation to Rwanda. Since the United States is such a powerful member of 
the UN, U.S. policy around the refusal to intervene in Rwanda significantly influenced the ability 
of the UN to intervene. PDD-25 showcases that the United States lacked the political will to 
become involved in further peacekeeping operations, and this influenced other UN member 
states to do the same. 
 While the lack of political will certainly had disastrous effects on the situation in 
Rwanda, the organizational problems within the UN also largely impacted the failure. The 
inquiry determined that there was a severe lack of communication between various parts of the 
organization and Member States, resulting in a lack of pertinent information. For example, 
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“representatives of several Members of the Security Council… have complained that the quality 
of information from the Secretariat was not good enough… More could have been done by those 
Member States with an in-depth knowledge of the situation in Rwanda to share information with 
the Secretariat.”180 There were clear miscommunications back and forth between the UN and 
member nations which inevitably stalled overall progress. More notably, however, UNAMIR, 
UN Headquarters, and other key governments, had information “about a strategy and threat to 
exterminate Tutsis, recurrent ethnic and political killings of an organized nature, deathlists, 
persistent reports of import and distribution of weapons to the population and hate 
propaganda.”181 The UN, therefore, had access to the information that pointed to plans for 
genocide, but organizational issues slowed action. The inquiry also states that “UNAMIR… was 
not planned, dimensioned, deployed or instructed in a way which provided for a proactive and 
assertive role in dealing with a peace process in serious trouble.”182 This points to the lack of 
resources and organization invested in the situation in Rwanda. UNAMIR was too small “and 
was beset by debilitating administrative difficulties… By the time the genocide started, the 
mission was not functioning as a cohesive whole.”183 This illustrates another instance of 
bureaucratic and systemic problems in the UN. The UN had plenty of time and information to 
stop the atrocities in Rwanda but ultimately failed because of systemic issues stemming from 
disorganization and lack of political will by member states. 
 In November 1994, following the genocide, the UN Security Council established the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which is an “international tribunal for the 
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sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda.”184 Despite the UN’s 
enormous failure to prevent or stop the genocide, the organization at least ensured the 
prosecution of the perpetrators. The ICTR indicted 93 actors in the genocide, which included 
“high-ranking military and government officials, politicians, businessmen, as well as religious, 
militia, and media leaders.”185 The establishment of the ICTR was a monumental step in the 
UN’s effort to address genocide. The ICTR is “the first ever international tribunal to deliver 
verdicts in relation to genocide, and the first to interpret the definition of genocide set forth in the 
1948 Geneva Conventions.”186 The recognition of genocide in an international court 
commissioned by the UN is an important step in the prevention of genocide. Despite that, there 
are still many issues within the UN itself that must be addressed so that the establishment of 
tribunals after the fact are not necessary. Not even a year later, the UN went on to repeat these 
same mistakes in Bosnia and Srebrenica.  
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Case Study: Bosnia and Srebrenica 
 The 1995 genocide in Bosnia is another instance in which UN inaction resulted in the 
deaths of thousands. Violence erupted when Bosnia declared independence from Yugoslavia, 
bringing up deep-rooted tensions between the different ethnic groups in Bosnia. The Bosnian 
Serbs had the mission of completely eliminating the Bosnian Muslims and creating an ethnically 
homogenous state. This violence ultimately resulted in the genocidal massacre in the Bosnian 
town of Srebrenica, which was the deadliest event in Europe since the Holocaust fifty years 
earlier. Like all genocides that came before Bosnia, the perpetrators conducted a reign of terror, 
rape, and killing. Despite the obvious warning signs, the UN was sorely unprepared to stop the 
inevitable genocide. 
 Six republics composed Yugoslavia prior to 1991.187 Several republics, including Croatia 
and Slovenia, seceded from Yugoslavia. While the other republics were relatively homogenous, 
the diverse population of Bosnia was “43 percent Muslim, 35 percent Orthodox Serb, and 18 
percent Roman Catholic Croat.”188 Bosnia initially hesitated to secede because if Bosnia 
remained as part of Yugoslavia, “its Serbs would receive the plum jobs and educational 
opportunities, whereas Muslims and Croats would be marginalized and likely physically 
abused.”189 The risks to secession, however, meant that “Muslim citizens would be especially 
vulnerable because they did not have a parent protector in the neighborhood… the country’s 
Muslims could rely only upon the international community.”190 Despite the risks posed to the 
Muslims, Bosnia declared independence in 1992, starting the Bosnian Civil War. This diverse 
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nature of Bosnia made it a target to Serbian nationalist forces motivated by the vision of a 
“creating an ethnically homogenous state.”191 The final goal of the Bosnian Serbs was 
undoubtedly to permanently eliminate the Bosnian Muslim population.  
 The classic warning signs of impending genocide presented themselves early on in the 
Bosnian conflict. For example, just like the Nazis did with the Jews in the Holocaust, “Bosnian 
Serb soldiers and militiamen had compiled lists of leading Muslim and Croat intellectuals, 
musicians, and professionals…they began rounding up non-Serbs and savagely beating them, 
and often executing them.”192 This violence began shortly after Bosnia declared independence. 
Eliminating the highly educated in society is a classic sign of genocide. The perpetrators want to 
ensure that there are few threats to their power and mission, and the highly educated naturally 
pose the greatest threats. The Khmer Rouge did this in Cambodia in the 1970s, even going as far 
as killing anyone who wore glasses. The Bosnian Serbs also destroyed “most cultural and 
religious sites in order to erase any memory of a Muslim or Croat presence,” another event 
typical to genocides.193 This clearly illustrates the Bosnian Serb’s mission of completely 
eliminating the Muslim population in Bosnia forever.  
There were also other signs reminiscent of the methods used by Nazis in the Holocaust. 
For example, Serbs posted decrees around towns that “informed non-Serb inhabitants of the new 
rules.”194 The rules prohibited basic actions such as hunting, traveling by car, meeting in public 
places, or contacting relatives outside of town, while also instituting a curfew from 4 p.m. to 6 
a.m. 195 The Nazis placed these same types of restrictions on the Jews. The Serbs also forced 
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thousands of Muslims to leave their homes. Power states that, “as refugees poured into 
neighboring states, it was tempting to see them as the byproducts of war, but the purging of non-
Serbs was not only an explicit war aim of Serb nationalists; it was their primary aim.”196 It was 
evident that Muslims were not being displaced simply because of war. Instead, it was because 
the Serbs had a plan to systematically purge Bosnia of any Muslim influence or presence. The 
Serbs sought ensure ethnic purity by severing “permanently the bond between citizens and 
land.”197 In order to do so, the Serbs  
forced fathers to castrate their sons or molest their daughters; they 
humiliated and raped (often impregnating) young women. Theirs 
was a deliberate policy of destruction and degradation: destruction 
so this avowed enemy race would have no homes to which to 
return; degradation so the former inhabitants would not stand 
tall—and thus would not dare again stand—in Serb-held 
territory.198 
 
This clearly shows the genocidal intent behind the Serb’s actions. The Serbs sought to ensure 
that the Bosnian Muslims, should they survive, would never even want to return. This all 
occurred, however, under the guise of the Bosnian Civil war. This inevitably delayed 
international responses to protect Bosnian Muslims because international organizations blamed 
their displacement on the unfortunate but natural effects of war.  
The international community responded to Bosnia in a similar way as in other genocides. 
It was easy to blame the violence on old ethnic tensions, as the international community did in 
Rwanda, for example. Power states that the targeted violence against Muslims “was 
euphemistically dubbed… ‘ethnic cleansing.’”199 Just as Lemkin intended, genocide is a strong 
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term that evokes images of the Holocaust and the worst moments of humanity. Therefore, calling 
the violence ethnic cleansing instead of genocide tends to downplay the issue. Subsequently, this 
may lead other countries to believe that they do not need to intervene yet because there no 
official genocide. A significant difference in Bosnia, however, was that the international 
community did not completely ignore the atrocities. Power states that “More than ever before, 
Lemkinian voices for action were heard within the State Department, on Capitol Hill, and on 
America’s editorial pages.”200 Public recognition of the violence is a crucial step in a country 
condemning and taking action against genocide. There was no such public outcry regarding 
Rwanda. The attention of the media, however, may be attributed to Bosnia’s location. The 
European location of Bosnia likely caused the public to take note and have more concern as 
opposed to their relative indifference to Rwanda. Despite public outcry, “for the next three and a 
half years the United States, Europe, and the United Nations stood by while some 200,000 
Bosnians were killed, more than 2 million were displaced, and the territory of a multiethnic 
European republic was sliced into three ethnically pure statelets.”201 The international 
community largely sat by while the instability in Bosnia perpetuated violence. Power states, 
however, that “the UN Security Council pointed fingers at the main aggressors, imposed 
economic sanctions, deployed peacekeepers, and helped deliver humanitarian aid. Eventually it 
even set up a war crimes tribunal to punish the plotters and perpetrators of mass murder.”202 The 
UN, therefore, took some action in an attempt to curb the violence in Bosnia. Despite that, the 
international community and the UN still failed to stop the genocide in Bosnia, most notably the 
massacre in the town of Srebrenica.   
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Today, the UN accepts responsibility for the failure to intervene in Bosnia. In July 2015, 
on the 20th anniversary of the massacre at Srebrenica, UN Deputy Secretary- General Jan 
Eliasson and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein discussed and 
reconciled the UN’s failure. The remarks centered around the need for “better efforts aimed at 
prevention and greater cohesion among the international community.”203 The ever-present 
dysfunction of the Security Council was evident when Eliasson and Al Hussein gave their 
remarks “as the Security Council prepared to table a vote on a draft resolution strongly 
condemning as genocide the crimes at Srebrenica.”204 Even twenty years after the genocide, the 
UN still cannot come to a conclusion that the crimes perpetrated by the Bosnian Serbs against the 
Bosnian Muslims amounted to clear and calculated genocide. Russia vetoed the draft 
resolution.205 This shows that the discord that impeded action in 1995 still persists today. 
Eliasson stated that UN peacekeepers still experience the same issues that handcuffed them in 
Srebrenica, such as, “paralyzing divisions among member states and a lack of political and 
material support.”206 They asserted that these political divisions in the Security Council directly 
resulted in “the UN’s ‘clumsy’ efforts in addressing the growing threats on the ground during the 
early days of the Bosnian conflict.”207 One of the major issues with UN intervention in Bosnia 
was that due to disagreements between member states, the details of the peacekeeping mandate 
were very unclear.  
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Most of the discord in the mission stems from the Security Council and the influence of 
the Permanent Five. The UN sent peacekeepers to Bosnia and expected them to conduct 
peacekeeping and enforcement of the peace but did not provide them with the necessary 
resources to do so. A report title “The UN’s Role in Former Yugoslavia: the Failure of the 
Middle Way” states, “although the Security Council resolutions for Bosnia were passed under 
the enforcement provisions of Chapter VII of the UN's Charter, the constant concern was that the 
use of force would compromise the peacekeeping operation, contradict the impartiality which is 
the hallmark of UN peacekeeping, and endanger the relief agencies.”208 Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter provides the Security Council with the ability to authorize the use of force. Despite that, 
however, the Security Council did not provide UNPROFOR with the appropriate resources to 
protect themselves and others. The UN ideally wanted the mission to proceed without the use of 
force, but by not providing resources necessary to follow through with force, they put the 
mission and the peacekeepers in danger. Intervention in Bosnia was doomed to fail because of 
the “wavering displays of authority to a non-committal use of force in countering an increasingly 
scaled-up Bosnian Serb aggression against ethnic minorities.”209 The “hesitation” and “timidity” 
of the UN and Security Council were central to the devastating results of the Bosnian genocide 
and the massacre in Srebrenica.210 
 Like Bosnia itself, Srebrenica municipality was also ethnically diverse with 
“approximately 37,000 people- 72.5 percent Muslims and 25.5 percent Serbs.”211 The Muslim 
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majority made Srebrenica a target for the Serbs to cleanse. It was clear, therefore, that Srebrenica 
was in imminent danger of being taken by the Serbs. As a result, on April 16, 1993 the Security 
Council passed Resolution 819 which declared Srebrenica a “safe area.”212 The Resolution called 
on all parties “to observe immediately the cease-fire,” and also condemned “all violations of 
international humanitarian law, including, in particular, the practice of ‘ethnic cleansing.’”213 UN 
action in this case differed from Rwanda in that the UN took steps to recognize the that the 
actions of the Serbs seriously violated international law. The Resolution further “demands that 
all parties and others concerned treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a safe area which should 
be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act.”214 While it was significant that the UN 
declared Srebrenica a safe area, the Resolution was still ambiguous in how UN peacekeepers 
should maintain and ensure the safety of Srebrenica. A report by Human Rights Watch states that 
the establishment of safe areas “provided for the placement of U.N. troops within the areas but 
left unclear whether force could be used to protect the enclaves and their population from attack 
or whether U.N. troops could use force only for their own self-defense.”215 This peacekeepers in 
Rwanda encountered this same issue. Not being authorized to use force to defend the Tutsi 
crippled the mission in Rwanda and contributed to the astronomically high death toll. In an 
attempt to clarify this, the Security Council issued a report regarding Resolution 844 in May 
1994 that “made clear that U.N. troops were authorized to use force to protect the ‘safe areas’ but 
that, due to a lack of troops, the U.N. could not guarantee the defense of the ‘safe areas.’”216 
While this resolution was necessary to ensure that peacekeepers had authorization to use force, it 
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still showed the lack of UN preparation due to insufficient troops. For example, this report states 
“that approximately 34,000 additional troops would be required in order to ensure full respect for 
the safe areas.”217 Due to a constraint of resources, however, the report estimated that only about 
7,600 would be available.218 The report recognizes that such few troops would not be sufficient 
to completely defend Srebrenica, but that it “would provide a basic level of deterrence, assuming 
the consent and cooperation of the parties.”219 The Security Council mistakenly placed good faith 
in the Serbs that they would be deterred by even a small UN presence. The Bosnian Serbs, 
however, already considered the mission a joke because of the obvious high level of 
miscommunication and disorganization from the UN. In order for peacekeeping to be effective 
and end the violence, both sides need to have respect for UN authority. The chaotic response of 
the UN did not demand respect. To make matters worse, “even this minimum requirement was 
not met by the troop contributors, thus severely limiting UNPROFOR’s presence in the safe 
areas.”220 The UN ultimately only supplied 3,500 troops to Srebrenica, only ten percent of the 
recommended amount.221  
Just like in Rwanda, a lack of political will from UN member states, including the United 
States, was a significant reason for the small number of troops. For example, “the early decision 
of the major powers was that Bosnia-Herzegovina had no strategic significance and they would 
not become militarily engaged in the war, but pressure to act in some way came from the global 
mass media and the general public.”222 Power agrees with this statement, stating that “President 
 
217 United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 
844, S/1994/555, 9 May 1994, 2. 
218 Report of the Secretary, 2. 
219 Report of the Secretary, 2. 
220 Report of the Secretary, 2. 
221 “The Fall of Srebrenica.” 
222 Anderson, 1995.  
 Haller 58 
Clinton made it clear that the United States would not send troops, and the European countries 
that had already deployed soldiers to Bosnia were reluctant to contribute many more 
peacekeepers to a failing UN effort.”223 Member states equipped with resources and troops chose 
not to intervene to stop the genocide because they saw the UN effort as a failure. This illustrates 
a stark lack of political will to prevent genocide by individual member states. Pressure from the 
media and international community only spurred mediocre action. The states themselves did not 
possess the political will to stop the crisis. This lack of reinforcements, due to the member states’ 
relative indifference, was detrimental to the UN effort to protect Srebrenica and its Muslim 
population from the Serbs’ genocidal acts. In his book, International Human Rights, Jack 
Donnelly argues that the UN did the best it could to alleviate the violence in Bosnia, but that the 
organization was not equipped to do more because of the member states. For example, he states 
that “the problem lies in the refusal of states to confer greater power on multilateral human rights 
institutions… states consider this ‘problem’ preferable to the ‘solution’ of transferring authority 
to an international agency that might force them to act more strongly.”224  This highlights the 
responsibility that member states have to ensure that the UN can respond to a crisis quickly and 
effectively, but that states have not adequately embraced this responsibility. This was detrimental 
in the case of Bosnia.  
 The UN was not completely alone in its presence in Bosnia. Due to the European location 
of Bosnia and the public knowledge of the violence, NATO agreed to offer air support to 
UNPROFOR. Should UNPROFOR fail or be overpowered, then NATO airstrikes would serve as 
backup to protect the refugees in Srebrenica and eliminate the threat of the Serbs. Recognizing 
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the gravity of the situation in Bosnia, Western powers “established a process by which the UN 
peacekeepers in Bosnia could appeal for ‘close air support’ if they themselves came under fire, 
and they could request air strikes against preselected targets if the Muslim-populated safe areas 
came under serious attack.”225 While this plan existed as backup insurance for the peacekeepers, 
it was not easy to initiate the air support. In order to send NATO jets, both the civilian head of 
the UN and NATO commanders needed to approve the mission.226 As a result of this structure, 
“most requests were stalled at the initial stage, as UN civilians were openly skeptical of NATO 
bombing.”227 While the additional support was good in theory, implementing it in practice 
proved extremely difficult. Therefore, “only a few hundred lightly armed peacekeepers and 
increasingly disingenuous threats of NATO air strikes guaranteed [the Bosnian Muslims’] 
safety.”228 The hesitation to commit to NATO airstrikes further proves the lack of political will 
by Western nations to truly intervene to protect the Muslims in Srebrenica.  
 Even though the UN presence in Srebrenica had good intentions, in reality the presence 
did little to improve the situation for the Bosnian Muslims trapped in the town. The Serbs were 
keenly aware of the chaos, disorganization, and lack of resources of UNPROFOR. The 
embarrassing defeats of the UN in both Rwanda and Somalia were no secret. The Serbs exploited 
the insecurities and squeamishness of the blue helmets and “frequently aimed their sniper rifles 
at the UN soldiers.”229 This clearly demonstrates that the few UN troops had little deterrence 
effect against the Serbs, who likely knew from the results of Rwanda and Somalia that the UN 
was not much of a threat. Furthermore, Serb forces “also repeatedly choked off UN fuel and 
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food. By the time of the July attack on Srebrenica, the 600 Dutch peacekeepers were performing 
most of their tasks on mules and were living off emergency rations.”230 This shows an utter lack 
of UN control in the situation. It is unlikely that peacekeepers could protect thousands of Muslim 
civilians if they were unable to adequately protect themselves. As a result of this, UN 
peacekeepers “interpreted their mandate narrowly, claiming that UN troops could use force only 
to protect themselves, not the civilian population.”231 This, however, was not the mandate of 
Resolution 844. The report regarding Resolution 844 states that the mission of UNPROFOR is 
“to protect the civilian populations of the designated safe areas against armed attacks and other 
hostile acts, through the presence of its troops and, if necessary, through the application of air 
power, in accordance with agreed procedures.”232 The UN troops in Srebrenica did not achieve 
this mission mostly due to the lack of resources. Therefore, “although the safe areas may have 
been created with good intentions, in actuality, they became UN-administered ethnic ghettos.”233 
The UN isolated Bosnian Muslims in a small area plagued by violence and tension without 
adequate food, water, shelter and other basic necessities. Power states that it was evident to both 
the UN and its member states “that the safe areas would be safe only as long as the Serbs chose 
to leave them so.”234 The Serbs knew this as well. For example, “by late February and early 
March 1995, only one convoy per month was being allowed into the ‘safe area’ to feed the 
approximately 39,000 people.”235 The Serbs also forbade any UN convoys from delivering salt to 
ensure that the refugees in Srebrenica could not preserve any food.236 It was only a matter of 
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time, therefore, until the weak and unprepared UN forces would be overrun by Serb paramilitary 
units.  
 On July 11, 1995 the Serbs invaded and took Srebrenica. The Serbs were aware that 
UNPROFOR was sorely underprepared to stop the invasion. Power states that the “assault went 
virtually uncontested by the United Nations on the ground and by NATO jets in the sky.”237 The 
failure of the international community, including the UN and NATO, to stop the Serbs from 
taking Srebrenica resulted in the massacre of 7,000 Muslim men and boys which was “the largest 
massacre in Europe in fifty years.”238 The massacre in Srebrenica was the most blatant act of 
genocide to occur during the Bosnian Civil War. The absence of adequate UN preparation was a 
significant factor in this massacre. The lack of cooperation among member states in the UN 
directly contributed to the lack of resources that led to UNPROFOR troops being 
“psychologically and physically exhausted weeks prior to the offensive.”239 This exhaustion 
resulted in UN forces not reporting “serious signals of the looming offensive.”240 For example, 
the report by Human Rights Watch explains that 
just two days before the attack Bosnian Serb forces allowed one 
convoy carrying 100,000 liters of diesel fuel, an unprecedented 
amount, into the pocket. This fuel was then recaptured when the 
‘safe area’ was overrun… Without the fuel, Bosnian Serb forces 
would not have been able to later bus tens of thousands of Muslims 
to Bosnian government-controlled territory.241 
 
This was an obvious red flag that the Serbs were planning something bigger, but the UN troops 
neglected to report it. The bussing of Muslims was essential to the Serbs’ ultimate extermination 
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plan to ensure their ethnically pure state. Without so much diesel, the Serbs would not have been 
able to carry out that aspect of their mission, potentially saving thousands of civilian lives. The 
lack of resources and troops, therefore, made the UN appear even weaker in the face of the 
Serbs.  
The UN did not effectively communicate to the peacekeepers on the ground in Bosnia. 
This information failure was also detrimental in Rwanda just a year earlier. Power explains that 
“UN peacekeepers in Srebrenica were probably the least well informed of all the interested 
parties. Like Dallaire’s hamstrung forces in Rwanda, the UN troops in Bosnia lacked an 
intelligence-gathering capacity of their own.”242 The troops in Bosnia suffered from the 
disorganization among member states at UN headquarters and the chain of command. UN troops 
in Srebrenica possessed no other option than to rely on UN headquarters for information. This 
vital intelligence came from “the more powerful UN member states, who rarely delivered.”243 
The peacekeepers in Srebrenica were essentially on their own because “if U.S. spy satellites or 
NATO planes picked up visual evidence or word of Serb troop advances toward Srebrenica, they 
did not share it with UN peacekeepers.”244 Peacekeepers, therefore, only learned of the location 
of Serb troops when they physically encountered them and their gunfire. The UN and NATO 
simply did not provide the peacekeepers in Srebrenica with proper means to defend themselves, 
let alone the city. As the Serb troops advanced toward Srebrenica, for example, they overtook 
several UN observation posts, taking fifty-five UN troops hostage.245  
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Furthermore, the peacekeeping operation had an inefficient chain of command that 
peacekeepers needed to navigate in order to receive information or assistance. The peacekeepers 
were often stuck in impossible situations, particularly when it came to the use of force. In his 
book, International Security Problems and Solutions, Patrick Morgan states, “efforts by 
peacekeeping forces to use even modest force to contain the worst excesses were also 
handicapped by the command system.”246 In order to use force, “officers on the scene would 
have to seek approval from their commanders, who in turn had to gain approval from the UN 
official charged with overseeing the operation. He had to clear everything with the secretary 
general who had to seek support from the Security Council.”247 When coupled with the 
disorganization and lack of will in the Security Council, this proved particularly disastrous 
because peacekeepers had to jump through many hoops to receive answers to pertinent questions. 
Peacekeepers had to battle the structure of the mission in order to do their jobs.  
NATO also abandoned the peacekeepers in Srebrenica by denying air strikes that the 
Dutch UN forces appealed for beginning on July 6.248 Without proper support, confusion ensued. 
The Muslim civilians naturally looked to the peacekeepers for protection, but “the peacekeepers 
expected the town’s largely unarmed Muslim defenders to offer the first line of defense and 
NATO airpower to supply the second.”249 As a result of a 1993 UN demilitarization agreement, 
the Muslims did not have weapons, including tanks and antiaircraft guns.250 The Muslims did not 
ask the UN to return their weapons because “they feared that if they took back their weapons, the 
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blue helmets would use this as an excuse to shirk their duty to defend the pocket.”251 Both the 
peacekeepers and civilians were gravely underprepared to defend themselves. 
The mission was further complicated by senior UN officials acting somewhat prejudiced 
against the Bosnian Muslims because of persuasions by the Serbs. UN force commander Bernard 
Janvier and senior UN officials were “long impressed with what they said was General Mladic’s 
military acumen.”252 General Mladic was the leader of the Serb army who commanded the 
invasion and subsequent genocide. Janvier and others were biased and easily persuaded by the 
Serbs against the Muslims because of their respect for Mladic’s military prowess. At the time 
that the Serbs took Srebrenica, “Janvier and other UN officers processed intelligence through a 
lens of a preexisting prejudice that held that the Bosnian Muslims were the ones destabilizing the 
peace and provoking the Serbs.”253 This distorted image, in the face of an undeniable genocide, 
shows that UN leadership was incompatible with an effort to prevent genocide. The Muslims, 
and those stationed in Srebrenica to defend them, were doomed because of the absence of 
leadership capable of recognizing the facts that invariably pointed to genocide. Mladic, on the 
other hand, had full confidence in his army’s ability to overpower UN forces in Srebrenica. UN 
leaders, therefore, trusted Mladic’s word as opposed to conducting an impartial peacekeeping 
operation. One could argue that, if anything, the mission should have been biased in favor of the 
Bosnian Muslims, because of the undeniable signs of genocide. 
By nature, UN peacekeeping operations are designed to be impartial in order to bring 
forward the cooperation of both sides to ensure a lasting peace. The mission in Bosnia, therefore, 
was constructed with the goal of “interposing neutral forces with the permission of the 
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belligerents in order to monitor or maintain a truce or settlement.”254 Why would UN leaders, 
who are expected to remain impartial in the first place, trust the word of a man accused of 
genocidal acts as opposed to seeing the thousands of victims as evidence against Mladic? This 
also raises the question of if staying neutral in peacekeeping operations is the best way to end the 
violence, or if the peacekeepers should be more inclined to protect the victims. Rajat Ganguly 
and Raymond Taras state in their book, Understanding Ethnic Conflict, that the result of Bosnia 
made “clear that impartial and limited military intervention, as attempted earlier by the UN 
through traditional peacekeeping, may actually be more counterproductive than partisan but 
aggressive types of operations.”255 The decisiveness of NATO’s ultimate military intervention 
illustrated that the method of nonpartisan intervention may not be effective.  
When Mladic and the Serbs invaded Srebrenica at 4:00pm om July 11, 1995, there was 
little that UN forces were able to do. The massacre began the next day. Power states that “while 
the UN soldiers looked on, armed Serbs ripped fathers, brothers, and sons from the hysterical 
grip of the women.”256 The UN peacekeepers were nothing more than bystanders once the Serbs 
took the city. To make matters worse, and to further contribute to the embarrassment of the UN, 
“many Bosnian Serb soldiers were wearing UN uniforms and helmets, walking among the 
displaced persons…fooling civilians into thinking they were really UN troops.”257 This shows 
how the chaotic UN mission did not intimidate the Bosnian Serbs in the least. Instead, it was 
essentially a joke to them. The Bosnian Muslims now had no protection from the UN and were at 
the full mercy of Mladic and his troops. Mladic’s plan included separating the men from the 
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women, where the men would be taken and systematically killed. The Serbs forced the women, 
children, and elderly onto busses to transport them to other areas controlled by the Serbs. In 
addition to the systematic killings of the men, the Serbs frequently stopped these busses “along 
the way so that Serb gunmen could select the young, attractive women for a roadside rape.”258 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia determined that rape was used as 
an instrument of terror. There was no doubt, therefore, that the Serbs were intentionally 
committing genocide in Srebrenica. There was overwhelming evidence to prove this. For 
example, on July 20 three Muslim male survivors were found “with the bullet wounds to prove 
what to that point had simply been feared: Mladic was systematically executing the men in his 
custody.”259 The survivors described that “some massacres took place two by two; others twenty 
by twenty. The men were ordered to sit on buses or in warehouses as they waited their turn.”260 
This further shows the systematic nature of the killings. At this point, UN special rapporteur for 
human rights for the former Yugoslavia, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, conducted an investigation that 
concluded that “7,000 of Srebrenica’s 40,000 residents seemed to have ‘disappeared.’”261 The 
Serbs systematically killed these 7,000 missing Muslim men and boys while the UN did nothing. 
Mazowiecki later resigned out of disgust at the UN’s lack of effort to stop the killing.262 
Senior officials within the UN were far more concerned with the image of the 
organization as opposed to saving the lives of countless innocent civilians. Power states that “as 
they had done during the genocide in Rwanda, senior U.S. and UN officials behaved as if they 
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were conducting business as usual.”263 In an effort to save face for the UN’s reputation, the top 
UN civilian Yasushi Akashi, “blamed the Muslims for their ‘provocation.’”264 The Secretary 
General Boutros-Ghali told the press that the fall of Srebrenica was not a UN failure, stating that 
“‘you have to see if the glass is half full or half empty.’”265 There is also evidence that the UN 
“destroyed video footage showing scenes of UN troops standing by while Bosnian Serb forces 
organized the massacred of Muslim men.”266 Destroying crucial evidence of genocide clearly 
shows that the UN is far more concerned with its own image than with carrying out its 
fundamental mission and values. As officials within the UN attempted to justify the lack of 
success in defending Srebrenica, “Muslim men of Srebrenica belonged to one of four categories: 
those alive and trying to escape through the woods; those killed on that journey; those who had 
surrendered to the Serbs and already been killed; those who had surrendered and who would 
soon be killed.”267 The UN still did not do enough despite the overwhelming evidence of the 
Serbs conducting a textbook genocide. Even the French president Jacques Chirac was highly 
concerned by the events in Bosnia, saying that “the separation of the sexes reminded him of 
World War II.”268 Chirac compared the international reaction to Srebrenica to “British and 
French appeasement of Hitler in Munich.”269 History once again repeated itself despite the 
proclamation that the horrors of World War II would never happen again. The many reports of 
genocidal violence made “the U.S. policy of nonconfrontation… politically untenable.”270 As a 
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result, led by the United States, “NATO jets engaged in a three-week bombing campaign against 
the Bosnian Serbs that contributed mightily to ending the war.”271 This came only after Bosnian 
Serb forces systematically murdered over 7,000 men and boys and raped thousands of women.  
In May 1993 the United Nations established the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Despite its existence before the fall of Srebrenica, ICTY was far 
more useful after the war ended. Since 2003, the ICTY has worked within all of the former 
Yugoslavia to ensure perpetrators of war crimes are brought to justice.272 The ICTY states that 
“the Tribunal has shown that an individual’s senior position can no longer protect them from 
prosecution.”273 The Tribunal also determined “beyond reasonable doubt that the mass murder at 
Srebrenica was genocide.”274 While the Tribunal did not exist to actually stop the genocide as it 
occurred, it now “aims to deter future crimes and render justice to thousands of victims and their 
families, thus contributing to a lasting peace in the former Yugoslavia.”275 Just like in Rwanda, 
the UN is retroactively attempting to make up for earlier failures. Overall, the ICTY has indicted 
161 individuals and found all of the fugitives responsible for the genocide.276 The success of the 
tribunal in light of the failure of the mission suggests that the UN may only be effective to deal 
with the effects of genocide, as opposed to stopping it. While it is crucial to bring perpetrators of 
genocide to justice, in order for the UN to follow through with the mantra of “never again,” there 
must be significant reforms within the UN system to ensure that genocide does not occur in the 
first place. 
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Ultimately, the discord among the members of the Security Council, particularly the 
Permanent Five, led to an ill-equipped and underinformed peacekeeping mission that was 
doomed to fail. The lack of political will of member states was an impediment to collective and 
effective action both through the UN and NATO. The UN produced a chaotic and unorganized 
response that did not demand respect or obedience from the Bosnian Serbs. This in turn 
emboldened the Bosnian Serbs to continue their genocidal campaign against the Muslims, 
culminating in the massacre in Srebrenica.   
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Case Study: Myanmar 
The Myanmar government’s targeting and mistreatment of the Muslim ethnic group, the 
Rohingya, is ongoing and evident. It is clear that the persecution and violence against the 
Rohingya minority escalated to the level of genocide and mass murder, yet the UN has still not 
declared the crisis a genocide. Thanks to the modern-day technology of phones, recording 
devices and social media, the world is watching the atrocities in Myanmar. This is pressuring 
powerful nations like the United States and organizations such as the United Nations to take 
action and recognize the presence of genocide.  
Several military regimes have had authoritarian control of the Myanmar government 
since 1962. Through the power of the newly adopted constitution of 2008, the Myanmar 
Military, the Tatmadaw, is essentially above the law and civil government. This allows the 
Tatmadaw to “retain its dominant role in politics and governance.”277 In order to reflect and 
maintain their power over the people and government of Myanmar, the Tatmadaw have used 
“numerous ethnically-based armed conflicts… to justify its power, presenting itself as the 
guarantor of national unity.”278 The guidelines set forth in the new constitution of 2008 
significantly contributed to the tension, marginalization, and subsequent violence against ethnic 
groups in Myanmar. The United Nations Human Rights Council states that “the military regime 
has constructed eight major ethnic groups, broken down further into 135 ‘national races.’ The list 
defines those who ‘belong’ in Myanmar.”279 The government issued classification of ethnic 
groups stating who is and who is not considered a citizen of Myanmar. This subsequently 
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facilitates the marginalization and persecution of the Rohingya because the Rohingya are 
considered “outsiders or immigrants.”280 This inevitably contributed to the unabated violence 
between ethnic groups because there is no national identity to unify the people of Myanmar. The 
Tatmadaw continues to dehumanize the Rohingya, stating, “‘despite living among peacocks, 
crows cannot become peacocks.”281 This sort of dehumanizing language by a group as powerful 
as the military is a sure sign that a genocide is on the horizon. Rhetorical dehumanization is a 
tactic used by perpetrators in virtually all cases of genocide or mass atrocity. For example, the  
perpetrators of violence in the Soviet Union referred to their targets as insects, the Nazis called 
the Jews rats, and in Rwanda the Hutus referred to their Tutsi targets as cockroaches. Referring 
to a group of people as subhuman allows genocide and killing to occur faster and on a larger 
scale because it encourages bystanders to take action to eliminate the “vermin” that is plaguing 
society. A New York Times article states that even “some influential Buddhist monks said the 
Rohingya were the reincarnation of snakes and insects and should be exterminated, like 
vermin.”282  This incites violence among the general population, urging people to take action to 
eliminate the ‘vermin’ of the nation. Like so many authoritarian groups before it, the Tatmadaw 
uses the Rohingya crisis and dehumanizing language as a way to promote itself as the protector 
of the nation against foreign invaders.  
Myanmar drew international attention, and especially that of the United States, when it 
recently began the transition from a totalitarian state into a democratic government. The United 
States fully supported Aung San Suu Kyi, the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize recipient, as the new 
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democratically elected leader in Myanmar because of her efforts to promote democracy in 
Myanmar.283 It is in the national interest of the United States to promote and guide the path for 
democracy in Myanmar so the nation does not fall under the sphere of China’s influence. It was 
believed that Suu Kyi was the best means to achieve that goal.284 Despite her past political 
accomplishments, Suu Kyi has come under international scrutiny for the crimes being 
perpetrated by the Tatmadaw. She repeatedly denies the allegations of genocide against the 
Rohingya, while also sharply restricting access of the international media and organizations to 
the Rakhine state.285 Over the past few years, Suu Kyi transformed from a “champion of human 
rights and democracy to an apparent apologist for brutality.”286 During testimony against the 
Tatmadaw and the Myanmar government on actions of genocide at the UN International Court of 
Justice in the Hague in early December 2019, Suu Kyi steadfastly denied the allegations of 
genocide and mass murder targeting the Rohingya. She refused to refer to the Rohingya by name 
when defending herself and her government because the official position is that such a group 
does not exist.287  
The human rights abuses that the Rohingya experience in Myanmar are vast and well 
known. According to an inquiry by former Guatemalan Foreign Minister and UN Ambassador 
Gert Rosenthal, Myanmar is in direct violation of international law. Rosenthal states that “in 
direct contravention of international human rights law, the Rohingya are denied citizenship under 
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the 1982 Myanmar nationality law, rendering them stateless since then.”288 In addition to the 
1982 Citizenship Law, Rohingya Muslims “have been subjected to restrictions on access to 
education, health services and livelihoods, underscoring that the lack of citizenship status and 
related civil and political rights… including voting rights, is a serious human rights violation.”289 
Rosenthal also states that “the institutionalized discrimination against Muslims in Rakhine 
state...was not only a core concern for the United Nations but had already become the center of 
attention of numerous member states, human rights advocates, as well as important segments of 
the media.”290 The UN and the international community are both well aware of the genocide 
occurring in Myanmar, yet have done little to stop the violence.  
 A UN fact-finding mission, commissioned by the Human Rights Council in 2017, 
examined the military reaction to an attack of three police border posts by the Arakan Rohingya 
Salvation Army that resulted in the death of nine border officials. The fact-finding mission 
determined that the military response was “a new major military crackdown, reportedly pre-
planned and premeditated, involving repression and human rights violations, all on a massive 
scale.”291 The fact-finding mission labeled the actions of the military as having “inference of 
genocidal intent.”292 The fact-finding mission used the term “inference of genocidal intent” 
because “in the absence of direct evidence, genocidal intent may be inferred from a number of 
facts and circumstance, such as the general context …the systematic targeting of victims on 
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account of their membership of a particular group.”293  Although the mission did not collect 
direct evidence of intent, there were ample signs to indicate intent. As a result,  
hundreds of Rohingya villages were burned and destroyed… 
estimates of some 7,000 dead, acts of pillage and rape, and roughly 
660,000 Rohingya people felt compelled to leave Myanmar, 
adding that number to the over 300,000 that had preceded them 
since 2012, and swelling the Rohingya refugee population in the 
Cox’s Bazar’s district in neighboring Bangladesh to around one 
million people, living in unspeakably dire conditions.294 
 
This extreme level of violence stands out to the international community. This clear evidence of 
genocide, along with recording technology, mean that Myanmar cannot orchestrate this genocide 
without a worldwide audience.  
 While the UN has attempted to be involved in Myanmar since the 1950s, a publication 
by Anna Magnusson and Morton B. Pedersen of the International Peace Institute states that 
“when the door finally opened for peace in Myanmar, it was not the UN that stepped through, 
but Norway; and when economic reform became a priority, it was the IMF and the World Bank 
to which both the government and others looked for leadership.”295 While the UN presence in 
Myanmar is notable and important, it is evident that the structural issues within the UN prevent 
the organization from being more effective in following through with the mantra of “never 
again” and putting an end to this apparent and violent genocide. Rosenthal states in his inquiry 
that the UN is ineffective in preventing genocide because 
in addition to the limits that the Charter imposes on the 
Organization in its relation with individual sovereign member 
states, those failures do indeed stem from systemic and structural 
obstacles to greater coherence on the part of the UN System in 
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carrying out its very broad and multifaceted mandates, and those 
systemic and structural obstacles are precisely the ones that need to 
be overcome or at least mitigated. In that respect, the case of 
Myanmar brings out more starkly than many others the nature and 
scope of those obstacles, as well as the dynamics behind them.296 
 
While Myanmar is certainly not the first instance in which the structural issues of the UN have 
prevented successful intervention, it is a telling example because it is currently happening. 
 The purpose of the UN’s presence in Myanmar, therefore, was to find “an end to the 
long-festering civil war and to promote democratization.”297 Up until 2016, the UN had a Special 
Adviser to the Secretary-General on Myanmar. The UN abolished this position in 2016 as a 
result “of the progress achieved since the 2015 Parliamentary elections” in which Suu Kyi 
assumed the role of State Counsellor, and it appeared as though democratic habits would reform 
the nation and curb the historic pattern of violence.298 Following the military crackdown on the 
Rohingya in 2017, however, the UN General Assembly shifted focus to the human rights 
situation in Myanmar. The General Assembly “adopted an unusually harsh resolution by a vote 
of 122 in favor, 10 against and 24 abstentions.”299 The resolution outlines the abuses that 
Myanmar inflicts on the Rohingya. The resolution  
calls upon the authorities of Myanmar to end the ongoing military 
operations that have fueled tensions among the communities and 
have led to the systematic violation and abuse of human rights of 
persons belonging to the Rohingya community and other ethnic 
minorities and to hold perpetrators accountable.300 
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While the resolution strongly condemns the state of affairs in Myanmar, it still does not mention 
the possibility of genocide in the text. While the resolutions of the General Assembly have no 
legal weight to them, voting on a condemning resolution sends a strong message to Myanmar 
and the world. The delegates from the nations against the Resolution— which included 
Myanmar, Belarus, Cambodia, China, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Philippines, Russian 
Federation, Syria, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe— argued that “the text was politically motivated and 
intended to exert unwarranted political pressure on the country.”301 This vote exemplifies the 
divide among member states when it comes to issues such as human rights. China and Russia are 
both members of the Permanent Five in the Security Council, the part of the UN which can make 
decisions that carry legal weight and are enforceable. This naturally makes the decisions of the 
Security Council the most important.    
 The issue of how the UN addresses human rights abuses that take place in a member state 
is one of the main obstacles in the UN preventing genocide. Rosenthal states that the UN “is 
armed with its moral authority, its values and principles, and its ample range of capabilities, but 
it has limited political space in countries whose Governments forcefully invoke sovereignty and 
non-intervention in their internal affairs as a cover for not meeting their commitments to abide 
by international humanitarian and human rights laws and norms.”302 The UN is limited because it 
takes the principle of preserving national sovereignty very seriously. However, the organization 
must find a way to grapple with the reality that in order to prevent genocide, it will inevitably 
violate sovereignty. Rosenthal explains that in dire situations the Secretariat of the UN can bring 
the situation to the awareness of the Security Council in order to create a legally binding 
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resolution. Rosenthal continues to state, however, “in the absence of the support of the Security 
Council, which is frequently restrained due to its composition and system of governance, the 
options of the United Nations to address the challenge in a manner consistent with its values and 
principles is often rather limited.”303 This is further evidence for why nations with little regard 
for human rights, such as Russia and China, should not hold positions of such high influence and 
authority on the Security Council.  
 The case of UN intervention in Myanmar is particularly complicated because of the way 
in which the government of Myanmar operates. Rosenthal explains that “the system of 
governance set up in Myanmar since 2010 involved both military and civilian elements.”304 
Because of this unique dynamic, the UN has to walk a fragile line when it comes to intervention 
so that it does not upset either side. The UN is essentially “having to interact with two parts of 
the same Government, with the possibility that some interactions of the UN with one of those 
parts could either provoke the agreement of the other, or risk further bringing about of internal 
divisions.”305 There is deep mistrust between the civilian and military components of the 
government. This makes it difficult for the UN to have a steady presence in Myanmar. The UN 
needs to be careful when navigating relations in Myanmar because bringing about further discord 
in the government would lead to greater instability. As a result, the presence of the UN in 
Myanmar, especially in comparison to other countries, is fairly weak. Myanmar is also very wary 
of intervention in its affairs because of the nation’s colonial history. Despite that, Myanmar 
participates in international relations because former regimes realized “that in order to prosper, it 
needed to interact with the rest of the world and the United Nations, but it did so with some 
 
303 Rosenthal, 11. 
304 Rosenthal, 14. 
305 Rosenthal, 14. 
 Haller 78 
misgivings.”306 Rosenthal states that “the ‘trust deficit’ created a complicated environment 
whereby the degree of access to the Government… gave National and State authorities sufficient 
tools to manipulate the Organization.”307 The fairly hands off approach in Myanmar essentially 
allows Myanmar to easily take advantage of the UN. For instance, while the government allows 
UN access in most of the nation, they forbid access to the Rakhine state where the alleged 
genocide is occurring. In a 2018 report from Reuters, former U.S. ambassador to the U.N. Nikki 
Haley said, “‘to make sure no one contradicts their preposterous denials, they are preventing 
access to Rakhine to anyone or any organization that might bear witness to their atrocities, 
including the UN Security Council.’”308 The unstable dynamic in the government contributes to 
the UN’s inability to aid and protect the Rohingya.  
 Despite the lack of physical help for the Rohingya in Rakhine state, certain bodies within 
the UN system frequently condemn the political state in Myanmar and the violence perpetrated 
by the government. Rosenthal states that former UN High Commissioner of Human Rights Zeid 
Raad Al Hussein “consistently and eloquently called out the human rights violations taking place 
in Myanmar.”309 His statements, however, were not followed up with any support from the rest 
of the organization. Many preferred the “quiet diplomacy” approach due “to the risk of upending 
a fragile but continuing political process.”310 Quiet diplomacy consists of 
exerting the maximum influence that the limited political space 
allows, in order to mitigate the human suffering being experienced 
by ordinary citizens through incremental, non-intrusive measures 
aimed at longer-term improvement in conditions, and to maintain 
access for the United Nations – albeit sometimes of a limited 
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nature – to pursue continued active engagement with the host 
Government, including calling it out privately to push for the 
respect of international humanitarian and human rights 
legislation.311 
 
This is the approach that is used quite often. The opposite end of the spectrum is “outspoken 
advocacy” which involves more punitive measures such as sanctions.312 While quiet diplomacy 
can be prudent in certain situations, it is essential to examine if that strategy is the most effective 
in the case of Myanmar. Following the military crackdown on the Rohingya in August 2017, 
“those that favored quiet diplomacy were reproached for complicity… of having deliberately 
kept quiet… in the hope of maintaining their access to the Government.”313 On the other hand, 
proponents of outspoken advocacy “were reproached for favoring perhaps well-intentioned but 
misguided proposals that would only have adverse unintended consequence or make the human-
rights situation even worse in the long run.”314 Some officials advocated that the UN push a 
“more robust posture of the United Nations to address the events in Rakhine State.”315 On the 
other hand, some “argued for quiet diplomacy to exert increasing influence on the host 
Government.”316 Having top officials in the United Nations on different pages regarding 
Myanmar is not a recipe for success. It is clear that the UN as an organization did not adopt a 
unified and cohesive plan for how to address and put an end to the atrocities in Myanmar. This 
subsequently allow the violence to continue. Rosenthal states that “without question serious 
errors were committed and opportunities were lost in the UN system following a fragmented 
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strategy rather than a common plan of action.”317 Disagreements among bureaucrats 
overshadowed the true purpose of UN involvement in Myanmar. Instead of having a concrete 
plan to address the issues as an organization, the lack of official direction severely inhibited the 
UN. Overall, the lack of UN success in Myanmar “truly can be characterized as a systemic 
failure of the United Nations.”318 
 This failure to create a unified plan of action stems from discord among the Permanent 
Five members of the Security Council. Over a decade before the attacks on the Rohingya in 
2017, the United Kingdom, a member of the Permanent Five, brought the issue of the 
persecution in Rakhine state to the Security Council. China, however, “argued that the situation 
in that country did not threaten international peace and security and should therefore be treated 
as a domestic issue.”319 Furthermore, in 2006 China eventually “agreed to include in the agenda 
of the Council an item on ‘The Situation in Myanmar’... A debate was held, but nothing tangible 
came out of it.”320 In January 2007 the United States and the United Kingdom, among other 
members of the Security Council,  attempted to ratify a resolution to address the violence in 
Myanmar. It was vetoed by Russia and China.321 The delegate from Russia stated, “While we do 
not deny that Myanmar has been facing certain problems, particularly in the socioeconomic and 
humanitarian area, we believe that the situation in that country does not pose any threat to 
international or regional peace.”322 The majority of nations on the Security Council voted in 
favor of the resolution because they recognized the severe human rights violations. Despite that, 
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the motion could not pass because of the veto of the Permanent Five. This is an instance which 
illustrates the dysfunctional and sometimes disastrous dynamic within the Security Council. The 
systematic persecution and violence against the Rohingya could have, and should have, been 
dealt with several years before it escalated to the level of genocide.  
 In September 2017, after the military crackdown on the Rohingya, Secretary-General 
Guterres pushed the Security Council to act to prevent further destruction of Rohingya villages 
and people. Despite the Secretary-General’s appeals, there was an “escalation of the crisis in 
northern Rakhine state, [and] the Council did not respond in either a forceful or a timely manner 
(by then at least 400,000 displaced persons were on the move, not to mention the mass atrocities 
that had already been committed).”323 Furthermore, it took two weeks before the Security 
Council met to discuss the events, and then an “additional 38 days to issue a perfunctory 
Presidential Statement.”324 It is evident that the bureaucratic nature of the UN prevented them 
from addressing the issue in a sufficient manner. The Security Council “received briefings on the 
situation in informal sessions, under agenda item ‘any other business,’ on 30 August and 13 
September.”325 According to the mission of the UN, it seems as though they should not simply 
group genocide into ‘any other business.’ The Council, therefore, had ample time to address 
reports, but the plight of the Rohingya was not a top priority for the council. There exists a clear 
structural problem of membership and priorities within the UN that prohibits the organization 
from realizing its founding principle of “never again.”  
 The Human Rights Council, however, has been far more vocal than the Security Council 
and the General Assembly in condemning the atrocities in Myanmar. For example, “resolutions 
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referring to the situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar 
were adopted.”326 The Human Rights Council created the Independent Fact Finding Mission that 
attempted to travel to Myanmar in 2018 in order “to establish the facts and circumstances of the 
alleged recent human rights violations and abuses.”327 The government of Myanmar refused to 
grant the mission access into Rakhine State. Despite that, however, the mission still gained 
valuable information on the situation in Myanmar and the violence that so many Rohingya 
Muslims face and are actively fleeing. The report of the fact-finding mission “details ‘clearance 
operations’ of the national armed forces known as the Tatmadaw, in six villages which 
experience massacres and other killings, including of women, children and the elderly, mass 
gang-rape, burning and looting.”328 In addition, “at least 392 villages were partially or wholly 
destroyed and over 725,000 Rohingya fled” with “estimates of 10,000 Rohingya deaths 
conservative.”329  The Human Rights Council, however, has no legal authority to enact sanctions 
on Myanmar to force the nation to stop the violence in Rakhine State. There must be a decision 
issued by the Security Council. Therefore, in order to fulfil its mission of protecting human 
rights and dignity across the globe, the UN must address the discord and dysfunction that exist in 
its system so that this can happen.  
 While the situation in Myanmar for the Rohingya appears bleak, there is international 
effort to bring attention to the genocide and push efforts to stop the violence. The African nation 
of Gambia recently sued Myanmar in the International Court of Justice, the UN’s highest court, 
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on counts of genocide.330 A recent New York Times article states that “Gambia, a small West 
African country with a largely Muslim population, was chosen to file the suit on behalf of the 57-
nation Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which is also paying for the team of top 
international law experts handling the case.”331 This is significant because it implies that it is not 
just the single nation of Gambia concerned with the safety of Rohingya in Myanmar, but an 
entire coalition of nations. The Attorney General of Gambia, Abubacarr M. Tambadou, emerged 
as a leader among the Organization of Islamic Cooperation because of his experience of “more 
than a decade as a lawyer at the United Nations tribunal dealing with the 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda.”332 Tambadou witnessed firsthand the disastrous effect of the UN’s failure to act in 
Rwanda. Therefore, he is attempting to uphold the UN’s mission of “never again” through the 
lawsuit.  
 Despite being the UN’s highest court, like every other aspect of the UN aside from the 
Security Council, the International Court of Justice does not have any legitimate enforcement  
power.333 Any nation, however, “can request action from the Security Council” based on rulings 
from the International Court of Justice. The UN states that “the Court’s jurisdiction covers all 
questions that states refer to it, and all matters provided for in the United Nations Charter, or in 
international treaties and conventions.”334  The ICJ is “the principle judicial organ of the United 
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Nations… established by the United Nations Charter in June 1945.”335 The ICJ, therefore, is an 
integral aspect of the UN. It is primarily used to settle disputes between nations, and it rarely 
deals with the question of genocide.336 The International Criminal Court, on the other hand, is 
not part of the UN and was implemented for the purpose of prosecuting genocide and mass 
atrocities. The ICC was established in 1998 and “has jurisdiction to prosecute individuals who 
commit genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.”337 The ICC is essential in bringing 
to justice perpetrators of genocide and crimes against humanity. The ICC is the court that deals 
primarily with mass atrocity crimes, so it is rare for the ICJ to handle cases on genocide. Gambia 
brought this case of genocide before the ICJ, however, because it is not a criminal case against 
specific individuals. Instead, “the case is ‘state-to-state’ litigation between UN member states 
governed by legal provisions in the UN Charter, the ICJ Statute, and the Genocide 
Convention.”338 
 On January 23, 2020, the ICJ issued a monumental ruling on Myanmar. The court ruled 
that Myanmar needs to defend Rohingya from actions of genocide.339 The court laid out several 
specific actions that Myanmar must follow. These include that Myanmar “take all measures 
within its power to prevent the commission of all acts within the scope of Article II of the 
[Genocide] Convention” and “ensure that its military…do not commit acts of genocide… 
 
335 “Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(The Gambia v. Myanmar).” International Court of Justice, International Court of Justice, 28 
Jan. 2020. 
336 Simons. 
337 Basic Facts about the United Nations, 279. 
338 “Questions and Answers on Gambia's Genocide Case Against Myanmar before the 
International Court of Justice.” Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch, 9 December 2019. 
339 Paddock.  
 Haller 85 
attempt to commit genocide, or complicity in genocide.”340 Furthermore, “Myanmar must take 
effective measures to prevent destruction and ensure the preservation of evidence related to 
allegations of acts within the scope of Article II of the Genocide Convention.”341 This is 
important to ensure that evidence remains to prosecute those responsible for such grievous acts. 
Lastly, the court ruled “that Myanmar must submit a report to the Court on all measure taken to 
give effect to this order within four months… and thereafter every six months, until a final 
decision on the case is rendered by the Court.”342 This shows that the ICJ fully expects Myanmar 
to take appropriate action to stop the genocidal acts against the Rohingya.   
 This decision by the ICJ is a great and necessary step in the fight to save the Rohingya 
and hold Myanmar accountable, but there is still a long road ahead in order to truly do so. The 
Security Council must take action because it is the only body whose decisions carry legal weight. 
Anna Roberts, the executive director of Burma Campaign UK, stated “‘The chances of Aung San 
Suu Kyi implementing this ruling will be zero unless significant international pressure is 
applied.’”343 While the UN is moving in the right direction through the ICJ’s ruling, the situation 
in Myanmar must remain an issue of top importance for the organization as a whole, and 
particularly the Security Council. If the UN keeps pressure and attention on the atrocities in 
Myanmar, it could help curb the violence. Drawing attention to the crimes that Myanmar is 
systematically perpetrating against the Rohingya will likely elicit condemnation from the 
international community, exposing Myanmar. As a result, Myanmar may stop the violence in 
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order to look better on the world stage. The UN, therefore, needs to continue to bring Myanmar’s 
human rights abuses to light. 
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Conclusion 
 It is clear that time and time again the UN fails to carry through with one of its core 
missions. Despite professing “never again,”  the UN consistently fails to protect millions of 
innocent civilians around the world from the horrors of genocide. The UN must to be fixed in 
order to do this job. For a variety of reasons stemming from the structure and membership, 
however, the UN is wholly unable to prevent genocide. Despite these monumental failures, it is 
important to concede that the UN does have the ability to do good in certain humanitarian areas. 
In light of this, the best course of action may be the UN simply accepting that is not equipped to 
prevent genocide. The UN, and the world, needs to moderate expectations of what the UN can 
realistically do in the face of genocide. There are a multitude of obstacles that inhibit the UN’s 
ability to intervene in cases of mass murder and genocide. Many of the obstacles stem from the 
structural problems evident throughout the UN, specifically the nature of the General Assembly, 
Security Council, and Human Rights Council. The alliance-like structure among member states 
in each of these branches significantly contributes to the lack of productivity. The branches of 
the UN are unable to work together and collectively issue effective responses to genocide. 
Therefore, the UN must stop professing that it has the ability and resources to prevent genocide.  
 Although the UN cannot follow through with the goals that it set forth in the Genocide 
Convention in 1948, the UN has still been able to uphold other important values outlined in the 
charter. Article 1 of the Charter states that one of the core purposes of the UN is “to achieve 
international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or 
humanitarian character.”344 To their credit, the UN has been relatively successful in 
implementing solutions to help those struggling with an array of problems, such as access to 
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fresh water or food or those suffering with the aftermath of war. For example, the UN is 
committed to ensuring the safety of civilians by removing anti-personnel landmines. The 
organization has been successful in significantly lowering the risk of landmines through two 
different agreements, the Mine-Ban Convention and the Inhuman Weapons Convention.345 As a 
result, “some 93 countries are now officially mine free, and 41 out of 55 producing countries 
have stopped the production of these weapons.”346 UN leadership in this area, therefore, directly 
contributed in saving countless innocent lives from the dangers of anti-personnel landmines.  
 Efforts by the UN to increase necessary access to clean water around the world is another 
point of success for the organization. In order to raise awareness and find solutions to the lack of 
fresh water availability to much of the world, the UN declared the 1980s as The International 
Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade.347 Ultimately, “the Decade helped some 1.3 
billion people in developing countries gain access to safe drinking water.”348 In 2020 the UN is 
still committed to improving access to fresh water for all by leading programs that “are geared 
towards the sustainable development of fragile and finite freshwater sources.”349 Steadily 
increasing water supplies to areas of dire need illustrates that the UN is capable of making a 
positive difference in the world. Despite the failures in preventing genocide and protecting many 
human rights, it is still a valuable coalition of nations that can provide aid in crucial areas, 
thereby improving and saving the lives of millions of civilians worldwide.  
 Simply eliminating the UN, therefore, is not the best course of action because it does 
possess redeeming qualities as a union of nations that work together to solve international 
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problems. This alliance-like structure, however, brings a whole host of issues that too often 
inhibit the organization from realizing its goals. Most nations, particularly small ones, are 
dependent on more powerful nations in their regional block. For example, smaller Asian 
countries cannot afford to upset China with a vote. This particular instance is extremely 
problematic in the case of human rights because China has a low regard for addressing human 
rights violations. This in turn influences Asian member states to vote with China in both the 
General Assembly and Security Council, even if it is not the right moral choice in accordance 
with UN values stated in the Charter. The  culmination of this is that most nations do not take a 
stand on major issues. The General Assembly passes many resolutions, but none of them carry 
any legal weight to precipitate concrete change. As a result, when it comes to somewhat 
controversial actions, such as condemning human rights abuses, the body is largely ineffective.   
 In order for the international community to truly have a chance at preventing genocide, 
the UN needs to step back. The UN must moderate its expectations of what it can realistically 
accomplish in the face of mass murder and genocide. While the Genocide Convention of 1948 
declares it a priority of the UN to prevent genocide, this goal has rarely, if ever, been realized. 
Due to the power struggles and political impediments that accompany the alliance-like structure, 
the UN cannot realistically prevent or end genocide. It is clear that “never again” is a bad 
standard for the UN. Due to the structure and politics of the UN, it will never have the ability to 
act swiftly and decisively to end a genocide or mass murder. While it is noble to have such a 
lofty goal, a sense of utopianism or progressivism may be distorting the UN’s judgement of what 
it can truly accomplish. In order to truly facilitate change, the UN needs to accept that it is not an 
organization capable of stopping genocide. This does not mean that the UN should ignore 
genocide, but that the world needs to stop looking to the UN for effective prevention and 
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intervention. Not only is it a waste of time and money to rely on the UN to stop genocide, but it 
also causes people to lose their trust in the organization as a whole. If the UN continues to make 
promises that it cannot keep, the world will continue to grow more distrusting and cynical of all 
aspects of the organization. 
 Proposals that are now central parts of the UN’s approach to genocide, such as 
responsibility to protect, are not very effective. Responsibility to protect consists of strong 
rhetoric condemning genocide, but there is no legal weight to the doctrine that ensures its 
implementation. One of the main ideas of the responsibility to protect is discouraging the use of 
the veto power by the members of the Permanent Five in clear cases of human rights violations. 
While this is an important cause to push forward, there is no enforcement mechanism in the 
structure of the UN that would actually prevent the use of the veto. The veto power makes quick 
and decisive action almost impossible in the face of genocide, when it is crucial to act quickly, 
because Russia and China ideologically oppose the principles of the responsibility to protect. 
Therefore, while the UN must continue to emphasize the ideas that the responsibility to protect 
promotes. The method for intervention to prevent and end genocide cannot rest upon this 
doctrine because it is too weak.  
In order to make the UN a body capable of stopping genocide, there would need to be 
monumental structural changes. Instead of the alliance-like coalition that characterizes the UN 
today, it would need to function much more as a world government. This would solve the 
problem of political will and alliances because the resolutions would, in theory, be enforceable. 
In practice, however, the only way to truly ensure that states comply with a resolution would be 
by force. Much like how the Articles of Confederations did not work in the early United States 
because the federal government would need to declare war on the states to enforce mandates and 
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taxation, the UN would have to militarily invade member states that refuse to comply. This is an 
absurd position to have an international organization dedicated to preserving peace declaring war 
on member states. Massive war would be inherently counterproductive to the effort to uphold 
human rights. 
Furthermore, the General Assembly would need to eliminate the process of consensus 
building. This would precipitate more effective legislation, but there would naturally be winners 
and losers of each vote. However, it is widely agreed upon that any sort of official world 
government would inevitably be disastrous for several reasons, one of which being the inherent 
infringement on each state’s national sovereignty. While structural changes like this may result 
in a UN that is a capable of taking a more active role in physically preventing genocide, these 
changes are not realistic. The notion of a world government is something that would be 
fundamentally dangerous to the national sovereignty of each state. In light of the improbability 
of structural change, the UN can still draw attention to genocide by publicly condemning human 
rights violations no matter where they occur. This is still effective because a nation is less likely 
to continue a genocidal campaign if the whole world is watching.  
Since the structure and charter of the UN are not capable of preventing genocide, one 
must consider other options to promote and improve human rights and safety around the globe. 
Senator John McCain was an avid proponent of protecting human rights and putting international 
pressure on totalitarian regimes. Senator McCain was well aware of the inability of the UN to do 
this, but he still acknowledged the importance of the organization. During his presidential 
campaign in 2008, McCain proposed his idea for a “League of Democracies.” He vowed to begin 
this league in the first month of his presidency. The League of Democracies is different than the 
UN in that it does not have universal membership. Universal membership is the underlying cause 
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of much of the discord and disorganization in the UN because it is not a coalition of nations that 
hold the same values. Organizing a separate body of strictly democracies would eliminate this 
issue because all democracies seek to promote similar values of human rights and the dignity of 
each individual. McCain stated that, “it is the democracies of the world that will provide the 
pillars upon which we can and must build an enduring peace.”350 Democracies have an inherent 
responsibility to be leaders and protectors of human rights. An association of democracies 
working toward a common goal, therefore, would be a far better way to contribute to peace 
around the world, as opposed to the dysfunctional group of nations at the UN that make many 
decisions based strictly on national self-interest. 
 The League of Democracies rests on each member nation taking responsibility and action 
to protect human rights. This is one of the central ideas of the responsibility to protect, but it 
would be implemented in a group that does not require Security Council authorization to act. 
States in the League of Democracies also may have more political will to act because of the 
common democratic interests that all members share. McCain stated, “no alliance can work 
unless all its members share a basic faith in one another and accept an equal share of the 
responsibility to build a peace based on freedom.”351 There is a severe lack of mutual trust and 
respect among UN member states, and this is undoubtedly one of the most significant inhibitors 
of success. A League of Democracies would have the ability to supplement the UN in areas in 
which the UN typically fails due to the lack of mutual faith. McCain stated that “the new League 
of Democracies would form the core of an international order of peace based on freedom. It 
 
350 McCain, John. “John McCain's Foreign Policy Speech.” The New York Times, The New York 
Times, 26 March 2008. 
351 McCain, John. “McCain Remarks – Hoover Institution.” The Hoover Institution, The Hoover 
Institution, 1 May 2007. 
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could act where the UN fails to act, to relieve human suffering in places like Darfur.”352 Such a 
group would have the ability to “bring concerted pressure to bear on tyrants in Burma or 
Zimbabwe, with or without Moscow's and Beijing's approval.”353 This would be a solution to the 
issue of the UN and Security Council structure without completely reworking the UN, which is 
unlikely to happen. McCain summed up the central idea of the League of Democracies with this:  
This League of Democracies would not supplant the United 
Nations or other international organizations. It would complement 
them. But it would be the one organization where the world's 
democracies could come together to discuss problems and 
solutions on the basis of shared principles and a common vision of 
the future.354 
 
A League of Democracies, therefore, would have the ability to truly implement change and 
action in order to protect and promote democratic ideals. Such a group would be safe from the 
corruption of states like China and Russia on the Security Council and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, and others on the Human Rights Council. It would instead 
rely on the political will of each democracy to work together with other likeminded states to 
protect human rights and promote peace.  
 The League of Democracies is a radical idea which naturally raises many concerns. 
Unlike the UN, a League of Democracies would not signal the will of the international 
community because it is not an inclusive body. Therefore, military intervention by the League of 
Democracies would be viewed as an act of war. The League of Democracies would lack the 
international legitimacy that the UN possesses, despite its flaws. Furthermore, intervention by 
the League of Democracies would likely appear overly aggressive and imperialistic. Powerful 
 
352 McCain, “McCain Remarks – Hoover Institution.”  
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Western nations with advanced weaponry storming into Africa does not reflect well on the 
organization. Furthermore, it is still not realistically possible to force sovereign nations to 
intervene if they truly do not want to. NATO is similar to the League of Democracies. Yet when 
the genocide in Bosnia was occurring in NATO’s backyard, it still took NATO far too long to 
divert any resources toward ending the violence. This could also very well be the case in a 
League of Democracies. Lastly, membership in the League of Democracies could be tricky to 
classify. There would need to be an in depth look into how the government of each prospective 
member operates. For example, North Korea is officially the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea, but it is anything but democratic. Membership would have to be gauged based on 
democratic tendencies or liberalism, but there is no specific answer to membership. The League 
of Democracies, therefore, is not the perfect solution. The principles behind it, however, deserve 
contemplation in light of the structural failures that inhibit the UN. 
The international fight against genocide is far from over, and it will likely never be done. 
While the idea behind “never again” is noble and important, the phrase should not be the 
standard. The UN needs to moderate its expectations as to what it can realistically accomplish. 
The structure and membership of the UN inhibit its ability to effectively take action in the face of 
international humanitarian crises. Despite that failure, the UN is effective in other areas that do 
not require quick or controversial action. This is why dedicating resources to a body dedicated 
exclusively to upholding democratic principles is a decent course of action to confront genocide 
and save innocent lives. Genocide cannot be ignored or accepted. It is crucial, however, that the 
international community, particularly the democracies of the world, step up to prevent genocide 
and stop the futile reliance on the broken UN system.  
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